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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-Too MUCH OF A GOOD THING: 
WHEN GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN WASTE DISPOSAL CROSSES 
THE LINE BETWEEN REGULATING AND "OPERATING" UNDER 
CERCLA 
INTRODUCTION 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA")l has long been viewed by 
courts and commentators as a big gun with a loose and unpredict­
able trigger. From its inception, the statute has been read as having 
the broad remedial purposes of removing toxins from the environ­
ment and making the polluters pay the cleanup bill.2 Consequently, 
courts have read CERCLA's liability provisions broadly, often in 
1. 42 U.S.c. §§ 9601 to 9675 (1994), amended by the Superfund Amendment and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9605 to 9675 (1994». 
2. For the purposes of this Note, which focuses on CERCLA's liability scheme, 
the phrase "broad remedial purpose" refers only to polluter liability. This view of mak­
ing those who pollute pay, dating back to the earliest CERCLA cases, has been 
summed up again and again in the catch-phrase "broad remedial purpose," which has 
become almost synonymous with the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 
U.S. 51, 63-64 (1998) (holding that if and when the corporate veil is pierced, a parent 
corporation may be liable for CERCLA violations); United States v. USX Corp., 68 
F.3d 811, 822 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that "CERCLA ... is to be construed liberally to 
effectuate its goals"); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 
1990) (stating that CERCLA is a "remedial statute designed to protect and preserve 
public health and the environment"); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 
F.2d 1373, 1378 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that CERCLA's remedial "sweep" is "broad"); 
Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 
1986) (stating that courts are "obligated to construe [CERCLA's] provisions liberally to 
avoid frustration of the beneficial legislative purposes"); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen­
eral Corp., 731 F. Supp. 783, 791 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (stating that "by imposing strict 
liability on broad categories of defendants, Congress also evidenced its intent to make 
the responsible parties pay for the costs of the cleanup"); Rockwell Int'I Corp. v. IU 
Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1389 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (explaining that "Congress sought 
through CERCLA not only to expedite the cleanup of hazardous waste sites but also to 
assure the equitable allocation of associated costs among all responsible parties"); Colo­
rado v. Idarado Mining Co., [1988] 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,578, 20,579 (D. 
Colo. Apr. 29, 1987) (stating that the term "operator" must be interpreted liberally so 
as not to defeat the statute's purpose). See generally Janeen Olsen, Comment, Defining 
the Boundaries of State Liability Under CERCLA Section 107(a), 2 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 
183,184 (1991) (stating that CERCLA was created to give the federal government "a 
prompt and effective mechanism with which to respond to hazardous waste problems"). 
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ways that conflict with traditional notions of liability.3 Unfortu­
nately for those courts that must apply this formidable liability 
scheme, CERCLA is equally well-known for its poor draftsmanship 
and vague language.4 . 
Section l07(a) of CERCLA imposes liability upon any statuto­
rily defined "person" who owns or operates a contaminating facil­
ity, or did so at the time the contamination took place.5 There has 
rarely been confusion where the same party owns and operates the 
facility; in question. In contrast, when one party owns the facility 
and another party has some degree of control over the operation of 
the facility, there has been considerable confusion and variation in 
the courts' methods of assessing "operator" liability? 
3. See generally Richard B. Stewart & Bradley M. Campbell, Lessons from Parent 
Liability Under CERCLA, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1992, at 7, 7 (noting that 
CERCLA's broad liability scheme often creates rulings that conflict with traditional 
notions of liability). The courts have read CERCLA liability as strict, retroactive, and 
capable of piercing the corporate veil. For further discussion of the courts' liberal read­
ings, see infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
4. See Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988) 
("CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision. It has been criticized frequently 
for inartful drafting and numerous ambiguities attributable to its precipitous passage. 
Problems of interpretation have arisen from the Act's use of inadequately defined 
terms ...."); Dedham Water Co., 805 F.2d at 1081 (noting that the Congressional pur­
pose is "shrouded with mystery"); Kim E. Williamson & Thomas W. McCann, After 
Union Gas II: The State as an "Operator" Under CERCLA, 23 ARIz. ST. L.J. 409, 409 
(1991) (noting that vague CERCLA definitions have led to some degree of confusion 
among interpreting courts). For further discussion of CERCLA's vague wording, see 
infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. 
5. Generally, Section 107(a) imposes liability on four categories of covered 
"persons": 
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or facility, 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned 
or operated a facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, 
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal 
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treat­
ment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any 
other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated 
by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for trans­
port to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by 
such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which 
causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance .... 
42 U.S.c. § 9607(a) (1994). 
6. "Facility" is a key term in determining CERCLA liability. For the statutory 
definition of the facility" requirement see infra note 27 and accompanying text. 
7. The two most common situations in which this issue arises are government 
liability, the subject of this Note, and parent corporation liability, which is also ad­
dressed in this Note. See infra Parts I.B & I.C for a discussion of the development of 
operator liability in the context of government and parent corporation liability. 
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This confusion is particularly noticeable when a plaintiff seeks 
to impose CERCLA operator liability on a governmental body. 
There are many situations in which a federal, state, or municipaUy­
owned facility could subject a governmental body or agency to lia­
bility.s However, governmental bodies, unlike private individuals, 
regulate waste produced by other parties' facilities for the public 
health and welfare.9 Because of such regulation, governmental reg­
ulatory activities almost invariably meet at least some of the CER­
CLA liability requirements.10 In addition, CERCLA's text and its 
treatment by the courts support the theory that such relationships 
may, in some circumstances, lead to liability for the government,11 
Consequently, courts and commentators have recognized that a 
conflict exists between two strong policy concerns related to gov­
ernment operator liability: (1) CERCLA's expansive liability 
scheme and (2) the need to protect governmental bodies from what 
could become almost unlimited liability for hazardous waste dispo­
sal.12 While the courts must adjudicate government operator claims 
8. Some examples include federally owned facilities, such as those maintained by 
the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy. See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 
972 F.2d 1527, 1533 (10th Cir. 1992) (examining the possibility of government liability 
for contamination at a Department of Defense facility). Because ownership and oper­
ating control are consolidated in one party (the applicable government body), liability 
would naturally attach to that party. See FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Com­
merce, 29 F.3d 833, 843-46 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc). But see id. at 848-49 (Sloviter, c.J., 
dissenting) (stating that Congress did not intend to waive the government's sovereign 
immunity for this unique situation-steering war production). 
9. See United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 324 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(Moore, J., concurring) (stating that "[u]nlike private persons, states and their political 
subdivisions possess and exercise regulatory power in their capacity as guardians of the 
public health, safety and welfare"). 
10. See Steven Ferrey, The Toxic Timebomb: Municipal Liability for the Cleanup 
ofHazardous Waste, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 197,233 (1988) ("Municipalities typically 
engage in one or more of four primary [liability-inducing] relationships when handling 
the solid waste generated within their borders."). See infra notes 26-30 and accompa­
nying text for a discussion of the requirements for CERCLA liability. 
11. See 42 U.S.c. § 9620(a)(1) (1994), which states: 

Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States (including 

the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government) shall be subject 

to, and comply with, this ::hapter in the same manner and to the same extent, 

both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including 

liability under section 9607 of this title. 

[d. 
In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) includes "United States Government, State, mu­
nicipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body" in its 
definition of "person." It is important to keep in mind that being a "person" is one 
requirement for liability under Section 107(a). For discussion of the courts' recognition 
and treatment of government liability, see infra Part 1.C.2. 
12. See Township ofBrighton, 153 F.3d at 325-27 (Moore, J., concurring) (discuss­
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with CERCLA's liberal liability scheme in mind, they must also 
take care not to overburden the government, and consequently the 
taxpayers (through increased taxes). Thus, it is still uncertain how 
much control the government must have over a facility before it 
becomes an "operator." 
In 1998, the Supreme Court decided United States v. 
Best/oods,13 in which it provided a general definition of the term 
"operator" in the parent corporation context.14 Prior to Best/oods, 
courts had used operator liability tests as varied as the cases in 
which the issue had arisen. IS Following Best/oods, however, judges 
have divided into two factions regarding the appropriate test for 
government operator liability. 
The first faction, typified by Judges Moore and Dowd in United 
States v. Township 0/ Brighton ,16 advocates the use of multi-factor 
tests and requires that plaintiffs seeking to impose government lia­
bility meet a heavy, fact-intensive evidentiary burdenP This 
method is consistent with long-standing, well established methods 
of determining CERCLA liability in both the corporate and gov­
ernment contexts. IS Best/oods called this longstanding test into 
question by offering no more specific a test than a simplified defini­
tion of "operator."19 However, Best/oods did not explicitly dis­
ing the importance of having a clearer "actual control" standard for district courts to 
use); see also United States v. Dart Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1988) (hold­
ing that the state agency did not amount to an "owner" as defined by CERCLA and 
was, therefore, not liable); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 731 F. Supp. 783, 
791 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (same). 
13. 524 U.S. 51 (1998). 
14. See infra text accompanying note 209 for the Bestfoods definition of operator. 
See infra Part II.A for further discussion of Bestfoods. 
15. The courts have not been able to settle on any particular liability formulation. 
Rather, they have advocated various approaches that have emphasized different factual 
requirements. See, e.g., Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 64-66 (emphasizing control over the 
waste-creating mechanism as a key factor); Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare 
Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 421-22 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasizing active employee manage­
ment and control over waste disposal mechanisms); Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & 
Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992) (declining to require actual control, in favor 
of "authority to control" test); Washington v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 474, 483-85 
(W.D. Wash. 1996) (refusing to hold government liable even though it managed work­
ers, controlled finances, managed costs, and was aware of waste disposal measures); 
United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1450 (E.D. Cal. 1995) 
(requiring "day-to-day" control). 
16. 153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998). Brighton is the only circuit court case after 
Bestfoods to have considered the question of government operator liability. 
17. See id. at 314-15. 
18. See infra Part I.C for discussion of this heightened "actual control" test. 
19. See Bestfaads, 524 U.S. at 66-67. 
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credit the use of traditional multi-factor tests.20 Thus, judges in this 
group argue that the traditional multi-factor tests are a necessary 
auxiliary that assists in applying the Best/oods definitional test.21 
The second pattern, advocated by Judge Boggs in Brighton, 
simply requires satisfaction of the general definition found in 
Best/oods.22 Use of this lower evidentiary burden places govern­
mental bodies on par with similarly situated parent corporations. 
Part I of this Note examines the legislative, statutory, and com­
mon law background of CERCLA operator liability, focusing on 
how this background pertains to governmental bodies. Part II ex­
amines Best/oods and Brighton, the only circuit court case since 
Best/oods to examine government operator liability. Part III argues 
that the appropriate test for government operator liability is a syn­
thesis of the Bestfoods test and the traditional multi-factor tests. 
Such a synthesis would appropriately balance the competing inter­
ests of CERCLA's broad remedial purpose and limited government 
liability. 
I. BACKGROUND OF CERCLA OPERATOR LIABILITY 
A. CERCLA Liability: The Broad Remedial Purpose 
Congress designed CERCLA to provide the federal govern­
ment with the "tools necessary for a prompt and effective response 
to problems of national magnitUde resulting from hazardous waste 
disposal ... [and to ensure] that those responsible for problems 
caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and re­
sponsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created."23 
To accomplish this goal, CERCLA established a comprehen­
sive response system that allows the Environmental Protection 
Agency ("EPA") to undertake cleanup using resources from what is 
commonly known as the "Superfund."24 Alternatively, the EPA 
20. See id. 
21. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 325-27 (Moore, J., concurring); id. at 
333-35 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part); see also Delaney v. Town of 
Carmel, 55 F. Supp. 2d 237, 260-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (analyzing a multitude of factors to 
determine if the party being charged as an operator had "actual and substantial con­
trol" over the facility). 
22. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 314. 
23. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 
1982); see also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(stating that CERCLA's primary purpose is to "force polluters to pay for costs associ­
ated with remedying their pollution"). See supra note 2 for the courts' recognition of 
this broad remedial purpose. 
24. See 26 U.S.c. § 9507 (1994). Congress envisioned the Superfund as a hazard­
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may bring suit against any potentially responsible persons to com­
pel cleanup.25 Liability is predicated upon four factors:26 (1) the 
contaminated site's status as a "facility,"27 (2) the defendant's status 
as one of four statutorily defined liable "persons,"28 (3) the pres­
ence of a "release" or "threatened release" of a hazardous sub­
stance,29 and (4) response costs incurred by a non-responsible 
party.30 Once a defendant is deemed liable under the statute, that 
party becomes responsible for undertaking the cleanup, or for reim­
bursing the EPA if it conducted the cleanup.31 
Once the cleanup is accomplished, CERCLA authorizes the 
party who paid for the cleanup (a governmental or private entity) 
to recoup its expenses by bringing suit against other parties respon­
ous substance response trust fund out of which the federal government could pay for 
cleanup of contaminated sites. See id. Revenues for the fund were to be collected by 
reimbursement from other liable parties found to have caused the contamination. See 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (1994). Revenues were also to be collected through a tax imposed 
on certain industries. See Thomas A. Rhoads & Jason F. Shogren, Current Issues in 
Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization: How Is the Clinton Administration Han­
dling Hazardous Waste?, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 245, 247-48 n.22 (1998). The 
status of the Superfund is a source of some legislative confusion today. Created as a 
companion to CERCLA, the Superfund was later reauthorized by the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 
(1986). In 1990, Congress extended the Superfund's funding authority through 1994. 
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 6301, 104 Stat. 
1388-319 (1990). However, since then, Congress has failed to amend or reauthorize 
CERCLA or the Superfund. Thus, there is no government money flowing into the 
fund, and the EPA has "taken steps to shut down the Superfund program if the finan­
cial resources are unavailable." Rhoads & Shogren, supra, at 250. 
25. Potentially responsible persons are listed in 42 U.S.c. § 9607(a) (1994). For 
the full text of this section, see supra note 5. The government may bring suit against a 
private party to compel cleanup if "an imminent and substantial endangerment to the 
public health exists." 42 U.S.c. § 9606 (1994). See also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 
958 F.2d 1192, 1197 (2d Cir. 1992). 
26. See B.F. Goodrich Co., 958 F.2d at 1198; Donald M. Carley, Note, Environ­
mental Law-The Federal Government Must Share in the Pain of CERCLA Cleanup 
Costs, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 93,97 (1995). 
27. All four categories of liability under § 9607(a) mention "facilities." CERCLA 
defines "facility" as "(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipe­
line ... well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor 
vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance 
has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located 
...." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1994). 
28. See id. § 9607(a) (listing the four categories). For the full text of this section, 
see supra note 5. It is the "operator" provision of this section that is the primary con­
cern of this Note. 
29. See id. § 9607(a)(4). Under this section, parties can only be held liable if 
there is a "release, or a threatened release ... of a hazardous substance." Id. 
30. See id. 
31. See id. § 9607(a). 
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sible for the contamination.32 The party that brings suit must then 
show that the four-part test for liability applies to the third party as 
well,33 
To include as many potential contributors as possible, courts 
have taken a broad approach to CERCLA liability, reading the 
statute as requiring strict liability,34 allowing piercing of the corpo­
rate veil,35 and allowing retroactive liability.36 In addition, liability 
is not limited to current owners or operators of polluting facilities, 
32. See United States v. Reilly, 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982). If the 
government funds the remedial action, it may bring suit against any parties responsible 
for the contamination. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1197 (2d Cir. 
1992). Alternately, if a private party is forced to undertake the cleanup, that party may 
bring suit for cost contribution against other responsible persons. See id. at 1197-98; see 
also Bernard J. Reilly, Superfund Reform for the l05th Congress, SC27 ALI-ABA 1, 5-6 
(1997) (describing Superfund authorization for EPA to recoup cleanup costs). 
33. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of these four 
factors. 
34. CERCLA states that liability "shall be construed to be the standard of liabil­
ity" applicable under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.c. § 1321 (1994). See 42 U.S.c. 
§ 9601(32) (1994). The courts have read the Clean Water Act as imposing strict liabil­
ity, a fact that Congress was aware of at the time CERCLA was passed. See S. REp. 
No. 96-848, at 32 (1980). As such, the intent of the actor is irrelevant to CERCLA 
liability, and some parties may be held liable even if they made no affirmative acts. See 
General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418 (8th Cir. 
1990) (noting that CERCLA is a strict liability statute with only a limited number of 
defined defenses available) (citations omitted); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & 
Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 731 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that the district court held that 
CERCLA imposes a standard of strict liability); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 
F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that Congress intended for CERCLA to be a 
strict liability statute, even though the statute contains no such express provision). 
35. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62-63 (1998) (holding that a par­
ent corporation may be liable under CERCLA for its subsidiary's actions, relying on 
common law principle that the corporate veil may be pierced when the corporate form 
is being misused); United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030, 1038 
(E.D.N.C. 1989) (holding corporate officer liable based upon the officer's day-to-day 
control over the business), affd, 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992); Uniteif States v. Conser­
vation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 416-17 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (supplemental memo op.) 
(holding corporate officer liable because he was primarily responsible for the facility's 
environmental controls), modified, 681 F. Supp. 1394 (W.D. Mo. 1988). 
36. Courts have stated that the legislative history and plain language of CERCLA 
point to retroactive liability. First, the covered persons provisions of CERCLA, 42 
U.S.c. § 9607 (1994), use the past tense when describing acts leading to liability. See 
Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 732-33 (stating that defendants may be 
liable for materials disposed of prior to CERCLA's enactment). Second, CERCLA's 
"statutory scheme itself is overwhelmingly remedial and retroactive." Id. (citing H.R. 
REp. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125); see 
also United States V. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1075 (D. Colo. 1985) (stating that 
CERCLA's "effective date" provision merely "indicates the date when an action can 
first be brought and when the time begins to run for issuing regulations and doing other 
future acts mandated by the statute"). 
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but attaches to any former owners or operators who were responsi­
ble for contamination.37 In further support of its broad remedial 
purpose, CERCLA lists only three narrow defenses to liability for 
an established owner or operator: contamination caused by an act 
of God,38 an act of war,39 or the act of a third party.40 
B. "Operator" Liability Under CERCLA 
CERCLA's operator provisions41 include a broad pool of po­
tentially liable parties. Rather than being limited to just the facil­
ity's owners, litigants may also seek contribution from those 
"persons" that operated the facility.42 In United States v. 
Bestfoods,43 Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Court, noted 
that this enlarged group of potentially liable parties could even in­
clude "a saboteur who sneaks into the facility at night to discharge 
its poisons out of malice."44 The term "operator" is thus pivotally 
37. See 42 U.S.c. § 9607(a)(2) (1994) (holding liable "any person who at the time 
of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated" a contaminating facility); 
North Carolina ex rei. Howes v. W.R. Peele, Sr. Trust, 876 F. Supp. 733 (E.D.N.C. 1995) 
(holding former corporate owner of a facility liable even though the corporation was 
dissolved). 
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(I) (1994). The statute defines "act of God" as "an 
unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, 
inevitable, and irresistible character, the effects of which could not have been prevented 
or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight." Id. § 9601(1). This defense has 
remained relatively untested and largely useless to defendants. See United States v. MI 
V Santa Clara I, 887 F. Supp. 825, 843 (D.S.C. 1995) (holding that a storm at sea was 
not an "act of God" because it had been forecast, and thus could have been protected 
against). 
39. See 42 U.S.c. § 9607(b)(2) (1994). Although "act of war" is undefined in 
CERCLA, one court has defined the term as the use of retaliatory force taken by a 
state to inflict damage on an enemy. See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. 
962,972 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (rejecting defendant's "act of war" defense). Like the "act of 
God" defense, the "act of war" defense remains relatively untested. See generally Mar­
tin A. McCrory, The Equitable Solution to Superfund Liability: Creating a Viable Allo­
cation Procedure for Businesses at Superfund Sites, 23 VT. L. REv. 59,79 (1998) (noting 
the lack of cases dealing with the "act of war" provision). 
40. See 42 U.S.c. § 9607(b)(3) (1994). This provision has proven the most valua­
ble of CERCLA's limited defenses; however, even defendants that rely on it are hin­
dered by three substantial limitations: (1) a contractual relationship between the 
defendant and the polluter negates the defense, (2) the defendant must show that the 
third party is the sole cause of the harm, and (3) the defendant must show that he 
exercised due care and took reasonable precautions against potential harm caused by 
foreseeable acts of the third party. See McCrory, supra note 39, at 79-80. 
41. See 42 U.S.c. § 9607(a)(I)&(2) (1994). See supra note 5 for the full text of 
these provisions. 
42. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 64-65 (1998). 
43. 524 U.S. 51 (1998). 
44. Id. at 65. This nefarious, fictitious character could be held liable under 
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important because the determination of whether a party is an oper­
ator could determine whether or not the court will impose liability. 
Despite the importance of the term "operator," courts gener­
ally agree that the statute provides little or no guidance regarding 
its meaning.45 Section 101(20)(a) of CERCLA simply defines the 
"owner or operator" of an on-shore facility as: 
(ii) ... any person owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in 
the case of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed 
due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, 
or similar means to a unit of state or local government, any per­
son who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at 
such facility immediately beforehand.46 
In addition, legislative history sheds little light on the matter. Like 
many of CERCLA's provisions, the legislative history surrounding 
the term "operator" has been criticized frequently for being circu­
lar, vague, and practically useless.47 
In situations where one party is both the owner and the opera­
tor of a facility, the task of determining operatorship is relatively 
easy.48 However, the task becomes infinitely more difficult when 
§ 9607(a)(2), which provides liability for anyone who operates a facility at the time a 
release of hazardous materials takes place. See 42 u.s.c. § 9607(a)(2) (1994). 
Although Justice Souter made this comment before actually discussing what types of 
activities could result in operator liability, he is clearly revealing his view of the broad 
implications of the Best/oods Court's operator liability test. For the Best/oods test, see 
infra text accompanying note 209. 
45. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. 
Md. 1986) (stating "the structure of section 107(a), like so much of this hastily patched 
together compromise Act is not a model of statutory clarity"); see also Best/oods, 524 
U.S. at 66 (stating "[w]e may again rue the uselessness of CERCLA's definition of a 
facility's 'operator' as 'any person ... operating' the facility") (citation omitted); United 
States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 19 (D.R.1. 1989) (stating that "CER­
CLA's definition of 'owner or operator' is not especially illuminating"), affd, 910 F.2d 
24 (1st Cir. 1990). 
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994). 
47. See Williamson & McCann, supra note 4, at 411-12 (noting that what little 
legislative history does exist on "operator" liability is, like the wording of the statute 
itself, circular) (quoting H.R. REp. No. 96-172, pt. 1, at 37, reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160, 6182, which defines operator as a person "carrying out operational 
functions for the owner of the facility pursuant to an appropriate agreement"); see also 
Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986) 
(noting that the court was unable to glean anything from legislative history other than 
the statute's broad remedial purpose, and stating that "CERCLA's legislative history is 
shrouded with mystery"). 
48. For example, if an independent corporation owns and carries out the daily 
operations of a facility there is little question that the corporation would be liable as an 
operator. See, e.g., Williamson & McCann, supra note 4, at 409-10. 
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two or more parties share control of the facility.49 Two or more 
parties sharing control of a facility is prevalent in the context of a 
parent corporation's control of a subsidiary and government control 
of privately-owned facilities.50 In those cases, the courts have fo­
cused on the degree of "actual control"51 required to make a party 
an operator.52 Government and parent corporation operator liabil­
ity share a common lineage which the following section will discuss. 
C. 	 "Actual Control" in the Parent Corporation and Government 
Contexts 
"Actual control" is a broad, nebulous term that nonetheless 
manages to generally reflect the equally broad and nebulous state 
of CERCLA operator liability. The phrase was first used by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit53 and has 
been repeated frequently by the courts discussed in this Part. Gen­
erally, "actual control" refers to the proposition that a parent cor­
poration or government agency must exercise some degree of direct 
control over a facility to be held liable for a release. 54 
However, the "actual control" test was not always the estab­
lished law. For some time the courts flirted with alternative tests 
requiring that, to be an operator, a parent corporation only needed 
49. For example, when a subsidiary corporation owns and carries out the daily 
operations of a facility there remains the question of how much influence the parent 
corporation had over the actions of the subsidiary in running the facility. See, e.g., 
Williamson & McCann, supra note 4, at 410 (noting that when more than one party 
could be construed as an operator liability can attach to each operator that meets the 
appropriate criteria). 
50. In the parent corporation context, control of the facility in question may be 
shared by the owning corporation and the parent corporation. In the government con­
text, control may be shared by the owning corporation and a government body 
(through regulation or direct supervision). See infra Part I.C for a discussion of the 
tests that have evolved to evaluate liability in these contexts. 
51. The "actual control" test holds a corporation liable for the violations of an­
other corporation if it exercised "substantial control" over the other corporation. See 
FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 843 (3d Cir. 1994) (en 
banc) (citing Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221 
(3d Cir. 1993». 
52. See, e.g., FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 845-46 (holding the federal government liable 
for contamination emanating from a privately-owned, but government-controlled, facil­
ity); Rockwell Int'! Corp. v. IV Int'! Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390-91 (N.D. Ill. 1988) 
(establishing a number of factors to be considered when determining whether a parent 
corporation can be held liable for waste disposed of by a subsidiary). 
53. See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 
(8th Cir. 1986) (stating that the defendant "had actual 'control' over the NEPACCO 
plant's hazardous substances"). 
54. 	 See supra note 51. 
231 2000] GOVERNMENT OPERATOR LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA 
to have the authority to control a facility, regardless of whether or 
not such control was actually exercised.55 In a leading case, United 
States v. Fleet Factors Corp. ,56 the Eleventh Circuit held that a se­
cured creditor (not a parent corporation) could be held liable if it 
was "participating in the financial management of a facility to a de­
gree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment 
of hazardous wastes."57 However, this "authority-to-control" test 
has fallen into disfavor among the courts, many of which have 
weighed authority-to-control against actual control and chosen the 
latter.58 Other courts have implicitly rejected the authority-to-con­
trol test by requiring affirmative acts on the part of the parent cor­
poration or governmental body.59 
The viability of the actual control test appears to be assured 
now that the Supreme Court has adopted it in United States v. 
Bestfoods.60 The remainder of this Note examines the origin of the 
"actual control" test and the competing theories of how it should be 
applied to government operator liability. 
55. See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th 
Cir. 1992) (stating that authority to control, even when there is no actual control, sub­
jects a parent corporation to liability); see also United States v. Carolina Transformer 
Co., 978 F.2d 832, 836-37 (4th Cir. 1992) (following the Nurad holding). 
56. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990). 
57. Id. at 1557. 
58. See United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1193 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
"an individual may not be held liable as an 'operator' ... unless he or she (1) had 
authority to determine whether hazardous wastes would be disposed of and to deter­
mine the method of disposal and (2) actually exercised that authority"); Lansford­
Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding 
that "the district court, by applying the 'actual control' test, applied the correct legal 
standard with respect to the operator liability issue"); United States v. Kayser-Roth 
Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that "[t]o be an operator requires more 
than merely complete ownership and the concomitant general authority or ability to 
control that comes with ownership"). 
59. See United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 822 (3d Cir. 1995) (requiring 
"substantial control" over a facility to be held liable); Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining 
that "a party must do more than stand by and fail to prevent the contamination. It must 
play an active role in running the facility, typically involving hands-on, day-to-day par­
ticipation in the facility's management"). Only the Fourth Circuit in Nurad has failed 
to retreat from its position favoring the authority-to-control test. See Nurad, Inc., 966 
F.2d at 842. 
60. 524 U.S. 51 (1998). The Supreme Court specifically stated that an operator is 
"someone who directs," not someone with authority to direct. See id. at 66. For further 
discussion of the Bestfoods decision and its implications, see infra Part II.A. 
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1. 	 Parent Corporation Operator Liability: Development of 
the Traditional Multi-Factor Tests 
Prior to Bestfoods, lower courts relied upon extensive, fact-in­
tensive tests to determine whether a parent corporation had suffi­
cient control over a facility to be considered an operator.61 Various 
courts' liability tests have been divergent in their use of specific cri­
teria; however, there was a common theme. Generally, a defendant 
was considered an operator if it exercised control over a facility's 
operations, personnel, and finances (or some combination of the 
three).62 
Due to the lack of statutory or legislative guidance regarding 
CERCLA operator liability, the first appellate courts to consider 
operator liability began looking to cases decided under the Clean 
Water Act ("CWA"), which has a definition of "operator" identical 
to CERCLA's.63 One commonly cited decision under the CWA is 
Apex Oil Co. v. United States,64 in which the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit based liability upon three primary 
factors: (1) control over the people and mechanisms that caused the 
contamination, (2) the ability to stop or reduce the pollution, and 
(3) ability to know of the contaminating release.65 
The courts in United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & 
Chemical CO.66 and Idaho v. Bunker Hill CO.67 expressly adopted 
the Apex Oil CWA standard in the CERCLA context.68 Similarly, 
61. 	 See infra this Part for a discussion of these tests and their development. 
62. This categorization of the traditional multi-factor operator tests is my own. 
The courts have applied various factors, presented with different levels of specificity. 
These courts' holdings will be discussed in this section. A synthesized test of specific 
factors advocated by the various courts would be unreasonably long and complex. 
However, the following discussion will show that the factors applied by the various 
courts fall generally into the framework of operationaVpersonneVfinancial control. 
63. See 33 U.S.c. § 1321(a)(6) (1994), which states, '''owner or operator' means 
... (B) ... any person owning or operating such ... facility." See Idaho v. Bunker Hill 
Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986) (expressly naming the CWA test as applica­
ble in the CERCLA context); United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 628 F. Supp. 
391,417 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (supplemental memo op.) (expressly adopting the CWA test 
and citing to Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1976), as analogous); 
United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 848-49 (W.D. 
Mo. 1984) (holding corporate officer liable on the basis of factors used in CWA test), 
affd in relevant part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986). 
64. 	 530 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1976). 
65. 	 See id. at 1293. 
66. 	 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984). 
67. 	 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986). 
68. See Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. at 672 ("The court believes that the [Apex 
Oil test, as adopted by the Northeastern court,] ... may properly be employed to deter­
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the court in United States v. Carolawn Co. 69 adopted the CWA stan­
dard in a CERCLA context by reference to Northeastern. 
Although retaining the basic standard that an operator must 
have some type of control, the actual control "operator" test was 
further refined in Colorado v. Idarado Mining CO.70 The Idarado 
court recognized the Northeastern standard, and also examined 
such additional factors as stock ownership, control over marketing, 
authority to execute contracts for the subsidiary, and control over 
personnel actions.71 The Idarado court held a parent corporation 
and a wholly-owned personnel services subsidiary liable for pollu­
tion caused by a subsidiary mining operation.72 Specifically, the 
court held Newmont Mining Corporation, the parent corporation of 
Idarado, liable on the basis of stock ownership, the ability of 
Newmont to execute contracts for Idarado, a high degree of overlap 
between the officers of the Idarado Mine and Newmont, and the 
application of Newmont's personnel policies to Idarado.73 In short, 
the court found that the parent corporation was "intimately" and 
pervasively involved in the management of the Idarado Mine.74 
Therefore, the court held that the Newmont Mining Corporation 
was an "operator" under CERCLA.75 
A noteworthy development in Idarado was the addition of a 
broad new element to the actual control test. The court remained 
faithful to the CWA standard by adopting the elements of person­
nel and operational control (specifically relating to pollution).76 
However, the court also discussed contractual control and stock 
mine when a parent corporation becomes an owner or operator with respect to a sub­
sidiary's facilities."); Northeastern Pharrn. & Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. at 848 (stating 
"this Court considers the Eighth Circuit's [CWA test] analysis significant in defining an 
employee's liability under CERCLA"). 
69. [1984] 14 Envt!. L. Rep. (Envt!. L. Inst.) 20,699, 20,700 (D.S.C. 1984) (adopt­
ing the CWA test, as applied in Northeastern). 
70. [1988] 18 Envt!. L. Rep. (Envt!. L. Inst.) 20,578, 20,578 (D. Colo. Apr. 29, 
1987) (stating that in Northeastern, "[T]he court adopted, for the purposes of determin­
ing liability under CERCLA, the definition of 'person in charge' as that phrase is used 
in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act"). 
71. See id. at 20,578-79 (drawing heavily on a general discussion of these factors 
in United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 416-17 (W.O. Mo. 1985) 
(supplemental memo op.), in which the district court held a corporate officer liable 
under CERCLA based on the CWA test factors). 
72. See id. at 20,579. 
73. See id. at 20,578. 
74. See id. at 20,579. 
75. See id. 
76. See id. at 20,578. See supra text accompanying note 65 for the CWA formula­
tion of these factors. 
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ownership and then added a third factor-participation in the fi­
nancial decisions of the facility, or, financial controP7 Thus, the 
new test that emerged required control over the facility's personnel, 
operations, and finances. 
Less than a year later, the court in Rockwell International 
Corp. v. IU International Corp. ,78 without citing to Idarado, effec­
tively adopted the test advocated in that case.79 In Rockwell, 
Rockwell purchased the facility in question from a subsidiary of IU 
and later found contaminants on the facility's property.80 Rockwell 
initiated monitoring and testing procedures at the site and brought 
suit against IU to recover costs and to obtain a declaratory judg­
ment that IU would be responsible for any future cleanup costs.8t 
The court denied IU's motion for summary judgment and held that 
there was sufficient evidence to find that IU could have been con­
sidered an operator.82 In reaching its decision, the court listed a 
number of relevant factors, including the hiring of personnel and 
determination of their duties, creation and enforcement of operat­
ing plans and guidelines, active participation in waste disposal pol­
icy, and review of requests for equipment purchases.83 Although 
the Rockwell court did not specifically refer to the Idarado formu­
lation of the actual control test, the factors it discussed fell within 
the Idarado formula: personnel control (IU appointed officers for 
the subsidiary), operational control (IU officers established and 
monitored compliance with operational guidelines, specifically 
those regarding disposal of waste), and financial control (IU offi­
cials reviewed recommendations for the purchase of equipment).84 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 
Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials CO.85 also adopted 
the Idarado factors.86 Hines and Mid-South Wood Products, a sub­
sequent purchaser of the Hines facility, sued Osmose Wood Pre­
serving, a chemical supplier that built a portion of the facility used 
for chemically treating wood, to recover cleanup costs.87 The court 
77. See !darado, [1988] 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,578-79. 
78. 702 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
79. See id. at 1390-91. 
80. See id. at 1386. 
81. See id. 
82. See id. at 1390. 
83. See id. at 1390-91. 
84. See id. 
85. 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988). 
86. See id. at 157-58. 
87. See id. at 155-56. 
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determined that Hines, and not Osmose, was the operator at the 
time the contamination occurred.88 In making this determination, 
the court noted that Hines hired employees (personnel control), 
regulated production (operational control, albeit not relating to 
waste disposal), and determined to whom, and at what price, prod­
ucts would be sold (financial control).89 
In United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp. ,90 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit applied factors similar to 
those in Idarado and reaffirmed the importance of control over 
waste disposal policy.91 The United States brought suit under 
CERCLA against Kayser-Roth for the cost of cleanup operations 
necessitated by the actions of Stamina Mills, a wholly-owned, but 
then defunct, subsidiary of Kayser-Roth.92 The First Circuit af­
firmed the district court's determination that Kayser-Roth was an 
operator of the facility.93 The First Circuit noted the parent's "per­
vasive control" over Stamina Mills-control that satisfied all three 
elements of the Idarado test.94 The court listed numerous ways in 
which Kayser-Roth influenced Stamina Mills' personnel and finan­
cial actions, but it paid special attention to Kayser-Roth's control 
over environmental pOlicy.95 Specifically, the court found that Kay­
ser-Roth approved the installation of a cleaning system that used 
potentially dangerous chemicals and that Kayser-Roth controlled 
the methods used for disposal of those chemicals.96 
In 1993, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir­
cuit adopted the actual control test in Lansford-Coaldale Joint 
Water Authority v. Tonolli Corp.97 In Lansford-Coaldale, Tonolli 
Canada created a wholly-owned subsidiary, Tonolli PA, to operate a 
smelting facility in Pennsylvania.98 The parent corporation, IFIM, 
88. See id. at 158. 
89. See id. 
90. 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990). 
91. See id. at 27-28. The line of previously discussed cases firmly established that 
control over waste disposal policy was essential; however, the Hines court conspicu­
ously, but only temporarily, broke this chain by failing to address this point. Instead the 
court of appeals found it notable that Hines had simply "decid[ed] how much to pro­
duce." Hines, 861 F.2d at 159. 
92. See Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d at 25. 
93. See id. at 28. 
94. See id. at 27. 
95. See id. at 27-28. 
96. See id. 
97. 4 F.3d 1209, 1220-21 (3d Cir. 1993). 
98. See id. at 1213. 
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later purchased both Tonolli Canada and Tonolli PA.99 After a 
Water Authority study showed an impending contamination from 
the smelting facility, the Authority brought suit against IFIM, To­
nolli Canada, and Tonolli PA to recover future CERCLA cleanup 
costsY)O The Lansford-Coaldale court upheld the applicability of 
the actual control test but remanded for further findings of fact re­
garding the roles played by certain officers.101 The Third Circuit 
stated that operator liability is "reserved for those situations in 
which a parent or sister corporation is deemed, due to the specifics 
of its relationship with its affiliated corporation, to have had sub­
stantial control over the facility in question."lo2 Significantly, the 
court noted that there are no decisive factors in determining opera­
tor liability, but that courts must look to the "totality of the circum­
stances."103 However, in creating a list of relevant factors for the 
district court to consider, the Third Circuit listed issues that fit 
neatly into the categories of personnel, operational, and financial 
control.104 
Thus, throughout the history of CERCLA operator liability, 
the actual control test established by Idarado and Northeastern ap­
peared frequently in the context of parent corporation operator lia­
bility with varying weight given to the different factors.105 Despite 
the courts' wide-spread divergence, a general pattern developed 
showing emphasis on the factors of personnel, financial, and opera­
tional control. . 
2. 	 Government Operator Liability 
a. 	 Statutory and judicial justifications for imposing government 
liability 
Under CERCLA, governmental bodies may be held liable as 
operators. Such liability is indicated expressly in CERCLA's lan­
99. 	 See id. at 1213. 
100. See id. The Water Authority dropped Tonolli PA from the suit because the 
company went bankrupt. 	See id. 
1Ol. See id. at 1222. 
102. Id. at 1220. 
103. See id. at 1222. 
104. The "critical questions" that the district court needed to consider were con­
trol of day-to-day operations, the sharing of corporate officers, authority held by those 
officers, and control over the release of hazardous substances. See id. at 1222-24. 
105. See United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 814 (3d Cir. 1995) (focusing on 
participation in liability-creating activities); United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1193 
(8th Cir. 1994) (focusing on control over disposal of waste); Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipe­
fitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 421-22 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasizing the impor­
tance of control over waste disposal and personnel actions). 
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guage and has been upheld by the courts.106 A statutory "person" 
under CERCLA includes the "United States Government, State, 
municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any in­
terstate body,"107 and operator liability is predicated on actions 
taken by a "person."108 In addition, the Supreme Court's decision 
in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 109 solidified the possibility of gov­
ernment liability.uo Thus, there is clear historical support for gov­
ernment operator liability. 
The outer boundaries of government operator liability are 
fairly well-defined. In situations where the government owns a fa­
cility that is staffed with government personnel, there is little ques­
tion that the governmental body would be liable as an operator in 
the event of a release of hazardous substances.1ll Control would be 
so pervasive as to leave little room for argument that the govern­
106. See infra text accompanying note 107 for CERCLA language authorizing 
government liability. However, courts have been reluctant to actually subject non­
owner government bodies to operator liability. See, e.g., United States v. Vertac Chern. 
Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding the government not liable); United 
States v. Dart Indus., 847 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1988) (recognizing, for the first time, 
the possibility of government operator liability based upon control of a civilian facility, 
but declining to hold the state liable); Washington v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 474 
(W.D. Wash. 1996) (finding the government not liable despite overwhelming indicia of 
control over the facility in question); United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. 
Supp. 1432, 1449-51 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (finding the government not liable despite pres­
ence of significant indicia of control over facility). But see FMC Corp. v. United States 
Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 845-46 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc) (finding the federal 
government liable for activities at chemical plant during World War II); United States v. 
Stringfellow, [1990] 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,656, 20,658 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 
1990) (finding the state liable based upon indicia of contrOl). See infra this Part for an 
in-depth discussion of the rationales used by these courts to avoid government liability. 
107. 42 U.S.c. § 9601(21) (1994). 
108. See id. § 9607(a). 
109. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
110. In Union Gas, the Court affirmed the court of appeal's holding that Con­
gress abrogated State sovereign inlmunity with respect to CERCLA. See id. at 6. This 
specific holding of Union Gas was overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 
66 (1996), in which the Supreme Court limited the potential for private party suits 
against States that refuse to consent on Eleventh Amendment grounds. However, as 
the concurrence in United States v. Township ofBrighton, 153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998), 
noted, Seminole Tribe would not apply in suits brought by the United States. See id. at 
323 n.2 (Moore, J., concurring). This issue of the breadth of sovereign inlmunity under 
CERCLA remains unsettled and is outside the scope of this Note. 
111. See FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 849 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (stating that "when 
the government undertakes to respond to society's problems through operation of its 
own facilities ... its activities are analogous to those of private parties, and it is conse­
quently subject to 'operator' liability under CERCLA"). See, e.g., Daigle v. Shell Oil 
Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1537-43 (10th Cir. 1992) (examining the possibility of government 
liability for contamination at a hazardous waste surface impoundment facility). 
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ment was not operating the facility. On the opposite end of the 
spectrum, few would argue that the government should be held lia­
ble for actions taken during the cleanup of another party's already 
contaminated site.112 By undertaking the remedial action, the gov­
ernment would be acting only in its regulatory capacity, and thus 
not as an operator. However, as the following discussion will show, 
the appropriate test for liability arising from the gray area between 
these extremes is far from resolved. 
b. 	 Importation of the "actual control" standard into the 
government operator context 
The first opportunity for a federal appeals court to apply the 
actual control test to a government actor arose in United States v. 
Dart Industries, Inc.113 In Dart, the United States sought reim­
bursement for cleanup costs from private parties and companies 
who allegedly generated hazardous waste materials found in an 
abandoned waste site.114 Those defendants then filed a third party 
complaint against the South Carolina Department of Health and 
Environmental Control ("DHEC"), claiming that it was an opera­
tor and that it negligently issued permits for waste disposal at the 
site and failed to install monitoring wells as it had promised.115 The 
Fourth Circuit held that DHEC was not an operator, noting that it 
had simply exercised its statutory duty of "loosely regulat[ing]" the 
facility after it had been abandoned by its previous owners.116 The 
court refrained from any detailed discussion of what would make 
the state an operator.117 Although it did not cite any corporate op­
erator liability cases, the Fourth Circuit stated that a finding of lia­
bility would have to be predicated on "hands on" activities at the 
facility, noting that there was no allegation that the state had any 
active participation in the activities that created the waste or con­
tributed to its release.118 
112. Indeed, CERCLA specifically states that "[n]o State or local government 
shall be liable ... for costs or damages as a result of actions taken in response to an 
emergency created by the release ... of a hazardous substance generated by or from a 
facility owned by another person" short of "gross negligence" or "intentional miscon­
duct." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2) (1994). 
113. 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1988). Note that the Fourth Circuit decided Dart a 
year before the Supreme Court gave its express approval of state liability for monetary 
damages in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 6 (1989). 
114. See Dart Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d at 145. 
115. See id. 
116. See id. at 146. 
117. See id. 
118. See id. 
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The following year, in United States v. New Castle County,119 a 
federal district court expanded on the vague actual control test used 
in Dart, giving a detailed list of factors that courts should consider 
when determining liability.120 New Castle concerned a "model 
landfill site" in which the State of Delaware took some degree of 
interest.121 Delaware was involved in various aspects of the land­
fill's planning and operation.122 When the United States brought 
suit against various defendants for cleanup of the site, the defend­
ants brought a third party CERCLA complaint against the state.123 
The district court declined to hold the state liable since Delaware 
had simply acted "as protector of the health, safety and welfare of 
its citizens ... with [out] any proprietary or financial interests at 
stake."124 However, the court did recommend a list of factors to 
consider when deciding whether to impose operator status: 
The Court should inquire, inter alia, into whether the person 
sought to be strapped with operator status controlled the fi­
nances of the facility; managed the employees of the facility; 
managed the daily business operations of the facility; was respon­
sible for the maintenance of environmental control at the facility; 
and conferred or received any commercial or economic benefit 
from the facility, other than the payment or receipt of taxes.125 
The New Castle formulation of the actual control test represents an 
adoption of the factors applied by courts in the corporate context, 
but with the added element of economic gain, which would be likely 
to remove a majority of potential government operators from the 
scope of CERCLA liability.126 
In the same year that New Castle was decided, the district court 
m CPC International, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp.127 expressly 
119. 727 F. Supp. 854 (D. Del. 1989). 
120. See id. at 869. 
121. See id. at 862. 
122. See id. The state aided in "site selection, planning, design, operations and 
determining the types of wastes suitable for disposal at the Site." Id. In addition, the 
state "required the submission of detailed information about the Site, its surrounding 
area and proposed procedures for the operation of the Site." Id. The State Board of 
Health also monitored the site frequently. See id. at 863. 
123. See id. at 857. 
124. Id. at 866. 
125. Id. at 869. The court noted that this list was not to be read as exhaustive, but 
as "part of a para materia inquiry in determining operator status." Id. 
126. Although it is conceivable that a government agency could choose to operate 
a facility of profit, none of the actors in the cases this Note discusses had such a motive. 
127. 731 F. Supp. 783 (W.O. Mich. 1989). 
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adopted the Apex CWA test128 in the government operator context. 
CPC Int'l and Aerojet sought to recover response costs129 from the 
Michigan Department of Natural Resources ("MDNR").130 CPC 
Int'l claimed that MDNR had agreed to operate purge wells at the 
site in question and provide local residents with an alternate water 
supply, which it failed to do.l3l There was some question as to 
whether MDNR had promised to operate the purge wells. How­
ever, the court noted that, if it had, MDNR's apparent nonfeasance 
did not protect it from liability,132 The Aerojet court found actual 
control by characterizing MDNR's assumption of control as an af­
firmative act.133 Thus, the Aerojet court denied MDNR's motion to 
dismiss.134 MDNR also argued that holding government bodies lia­
128. See id. at 788 (citing United States v. Mobil Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 1124, 1127 
(5th Cir. 1972), adopted in Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1291, 1293 (8th Cir. 
1976». The Aerojet case falls somewhat outside the mainstream of actual control test 
jurisprudence because one could read the opinion as advocating an authority-to-control 
test. See supra text accompanying note 65 for the Apex text. The Aerojet court quoted 
language adopted in Apex that tends to indicate the authority test. See supra notes 55­
57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the authority-to-control test. However, 
the Aerojet court also quoted language from Dart that seems to indicate an actual con­
trol requirement: "The generators are unable to specify any 'hands on' activities by [the 
defendant] that contributed to the release of hazardous wastes." Aerojet-General 
Corp., 731 F. Supp. at 788 (quoting United States v. Dart Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 144, 146 
(4th Cir. 1988». In any event, the Aerojet court was never clear as to which test it was 
using. Still, the important issue is the multi-factor test the Aerojet court advocated, 
particularly considering that the Sixth Circuit later expressly rejected the authority-to­
control test. See United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 314 (6th Cir. 
1998) (rejecting the authority-to-control test). It is also important to note that the Aer
ojet court failed to make mention of New Castle or the economic gain factor that the 
New Castle court imposed. 
129. CERCLA defines "response" as "removal, remedy, and remedial action." 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1994). The statute defines "removal" as "the cleanup or removal 
of released hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as may be neces­
sary taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the envi­
ronment ...." Id. § 9601(23). "Remedy" and "remedial action" are defined as: 
[T]hose actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addi­
tion to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a 
hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release 
of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial dan­
ger to present or future public health or welfare or the environment. 
Id. 	§ 9601(24). 
For further discussion of CERCLA's response cost recovery infrastructure, see 
supra notes 24-25. 
130. See Aerojet-General Corp., 731 F. Supp. at 785. 
131. See id. at 786. 
132. See id. at 788. 
133. See id. at 788-89. 
134. See id. at 792. 
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ble creates a "disincentive for undertaking remedial actions. "135 
However, the Aerojet court emphasized CERCLA's broad reme­
dial purpose, implying that the importance of holding responsible 
parties liable may outweigh the policy against avoiding government 
liability.B6 
The following year, in United States v. Stringfellow,137 a Cali­
fornia district court held a government actor liable under CERCLA 
for the first time.138 The court based liability on the fact that the 
state hired employees for the facility, made operational decisions, 
actively controlled waste disposal at the site, opened and closed the 
site, and regulated who could dump and what could be dumped at 
the facility.B9 
Four years later, in the landmark case FMC Corp. v. United 
States Department of Commerce,140 the Third Circuit held the fed­
eral government liable as an operator for its actions during World 
War II at a manufacturing facility owned by the American Viscose 
Corporation ("AVC").141 The plant was one of the few in the coun­
try that produced high tenacity rayon, a material pivotal to the 
American war effort.142 
The government, under the auspices of the War Production 
Board, Textile, Clothing and Leather Division, ("WPB"), instructed 
AVC to expand and increase its production of high tenacity rayon, 
and would, in fact, have seized the factory if AVC was unable to 
meet the WPB's standards.143 In order to help AVC facilitate this 
expansion, the government, through the Defense Plant Corporation 
("DPC"), provided AVC with leased government-owned equip­
ment and machinery and hired a third party, Rust Engineering 
Company ("Rust"), to design and install the equipment.144 In addi­
tion, through its contract with Rust, the DPC regulated the 
135. Id. at 791. 
136. See id. See infra Part III for a further discussion of the policies for and 
against government liability. 
137. [1990] 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,656 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1990). 
138. See id. See supra note 106 for discussion of courts' theoretical approval and 
practical reticence regarding government liability. Also note that although the Aerojet 
court denied the government's motion to dismiss, judgment was not actually rendered 
against the government. See Aerojet-General Corp., 731 F. Supp. at 792. 
139. See Stringfellow, [1990] 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,658. 
140. 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994). 
141. See id. at 843-44. AVC later sold the property to FMC Corp., the plaintiff in 
this case. See id. at 835. 
142. See id. at 836. 
143. See id. 
144. See id. at 837. 
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purchase of supplies, created operating plans for the facility, and 
had the authority to remove the contractor's employees from the 
facility.145 The DPC also installed a full-time representative at the 
facility to monitor and supervise Rust's employees. l46 
To provide a steady stream of raw materials to the plant, the 
government built and maintained a sulfuric acid plant adjacent to 
the AVC facility and contracted with a third party to build a carbon 
bisulfide plant in the area.147 The government required AVC to ac­
cept the materials from these facilities. l48 When the government 
decided the workforce at the AVC plant was inadequate, it pro­
vided draft defer.ments to employees, recruited employees from 
other industries, housed the incoming workers, and managed and 
supervised the plant's employees.149 To facilitate this new initiative, 
the WPB assigned a full-time personnel manager to the facility.150 
The government also regulated the supply and price of materials 
flowing in and out of the factory.151 As a result, the government 
became aware that the production of high tenacity rayon created a 
great deal of waste, and "personnel present at the facility witnessed 
a large amount of highly visible waste disposal activity."152 
In 1982, testing of the area's groundwater revealed dangerous 
chemicals that had been used in rayon production.153 Subse­
quently, the EPA initiated cleanup operations and sought to re­
cover the cost from FMC, which in turn filed suit against the United 
States Department of Commerce, claiming that the federal govern­
ment was liable as an operator.154 
The FMC court held the federal government liable for cleanup 
costs as an operator155 and arranger.156 In finding operator liability, 
145. See id. 
146. See id. 
147. See id. 
148. See id. 
149. See id. 
150. See id. 
151. See id. 
152. Id. at 837-38. 
153. See id. at 835. 
154. See id. 
155. See id. at 845. 
156. Arranger liability is predicated upon 42 U.S.c. § 9607(a)(3) (1994), which 
imposes liability upon "any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged 
for disposal or treatment ... of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such per­
son ...." Id. Since the FMC court was divided on the issue of arranger liability, and 
the issue of operator liability had already been settled, the court simply affirmed the 
lower court's judgment on arranger liability without discussion. See FMC Corp., 29 
F.3d at 846. 
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the Third Circuit first adopted, in the government context, the ac­
tual control test it had applied a year earlier in the parent corpora­
tion context.157 This test emphasized control of day-to-day 
operations, the sharing of corporate officers, and control over the 
release of hazardous substances.15S In further defining this test, the 
FMC court cited the tests applied by the courts in United States v. 
New Castle County I59 and Colorado v. Idarado Mining CO.IOO 
However, the court independently announced a list of what it called 
the "leading indicia of control": control over items in production, 
levels of production, the product's price, and customers to whom 
the facility's owner sold the product.161 Applying these factors, as 
well as those from Idarado I62 and New Castle,163 to the facts of 
FMC, the Third Circuit found that the government had sufficient 
control of the facility to hold the United States liable as an opera­
tor.164 Specifically, the court cited findings that the government 
had controlled the facility's raw materials, built and sanctioned the 
building of neighboring plants to support the AVC facility, created 
and maintained a workforce for the plant, managed the personnel, 
and controlled the product's price and market.165 
The Third Circuit distinguished FMC from Dart and New Cas­
tie, cases in which the courts did not find sufficient government con­
trol,l66 noting that, in Dart, the state had neither financial nor 
157. See FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843 (stating that using the actual control test to 
impose liability is inconsistent with '''traditional rules of limited liability for corpora­
tions,'" but nevertheless is consistent with "CERCLA's broad remedial purposes") 
(quoting Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221 (3d 
Cir. 1993». 
158. See Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth., 4 F.3d at 1222-24. 
159. 727 F. Supp. 854 (D. Del. 1989); see also FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843. The 
New Castle court emphasized financial control, employee management, control over 
daily business operations, control over maintenance of environmental controls, and 
commercial or economic benefit received by the defendant. See New Castle County, 
727 F. Supp. at 869. See supra text accompanying note 125 for the New Castle formula­
tion of the actual control test. 
160. [1988] 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,578 (D. Colo. Apr. 29, 1987); see 
also FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843-44. The Idarado court emphasized stock ownership, the 
ability of the defendant to execute contracts for the facility, a high degree of overlap 
between the officers of the parent and subsidiary, and the application of the parent's 
personnel policies to the subsidiary. See Idarado Mining Co., [1988] 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,578. See supra text accompanying note 73 for the Idarado test. 
161. See FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843. 
162. See supra note 160. 
163. See supra note 159. 
164. See FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843. 
165. See id. 
166. See id. at 843-44. 
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operational control over the facility.167 In addition, the FMC court 
found it significant that in neither Dart nor New Castle did the gov­
ernment produce a product for its own use, as occurred in FMC.168 
The following year, in United States v. Vertac Chemical 
Corp. ,169 the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on FMC in declining to 
impose government liability po During the 1950's the facility in 
question produced a number of chemical herbicides. l7l In 1961, 
Hercules, Inc. purchased the facility and subsequently won a gov­
ernment contract to make the chemical herbicide known as Agent 
Orange for use in Vietnam.l72 In conjunction with this contract, the 
government designated Agent Orange production by Hercules a 
"rated order," to take precedence over any of Hercules' other con­
tractsP3 The terms of the government contract were substantially 
dictated by the Department of Defense.174 In addition, the contract 
subjected Hercules to government-created health and safety stan­
dards, which were enforced by random inspections.175 
After repeated demands by the United States government that 
Hercules increase production, the government facilitated the chem­
ical manufacturer's importation of the necessary component chemi­
cals.176 The government waived import duties for these 
components and issued a directive to a chemical supplier to ensure 
that a constant supply of raw materials continued to flow to Agent 
Orange producers, including Herculesp7 
The government did not establish or attempt to establish waste 
disposal policies, and Hercules did not consult government officials 
on its waste disposal policiesP8 The government eventually discov­
ered contamination, undertook cleanup, and sought cost recovery 
from the owners and direct operators of the site.179 The defend­
ants, in response, filed suit against the United States, claiming that 
167. See id. at 844. 
168. See id. 
169. 46 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1995). 
170. See id. at 808-09. 
171. See id. at 806 (noting that at the time, the facility was owned by Reasor-Hill 
Corp). 
172. See id. 
173. See id. 
174. See id. 
175. See id. at 806-07. These were required by the Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.c. 
§ 35 (1994). See id. 
176. See Venae Chern. Corp., 46 F.3d at 807. 
177. See id. 
178. See id. 
179. See id. These parties included Hercules, Inc.; Vertac Chern. Corp.; Uniroyal 
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the government was a liable operator.180 
The Eighth Circuit held that the United States was not liable as 
an operator181 or an arranger.182 Adopting the FMC court's use of 
the actual control test,183 the court emphasized two factors present 
in FMC that were absent in the present case. First, in FMC the 
government, not the manufacturer, determined the product the fa­
cility would produce.l84 Here, Hercules chose to bid on the pro­
ject.185 Second, in FMC the government "'exerted considerable 
day-to-day control over American Viscose,"'186 including extensive 
management of personnel, a factor which was absent in the present 
case. No government representative ever "managed or supervised 
any Hercules personnel."187 
The same year that the Eighth Circuit decided Vertae, a Cali­
fornia district court rejected government liability in United States v. 
Iron Mountain Mines, Ine. 188 During World War II, the federal 
government prohibited gold mining at the Iron Mountain Mine and 
instead encouraged the mining of copper and zinc by instituting the 
Premium Price Plan.189 The owners of the mine entered into a con­
tract that provided the government with all of the mine's output, as 
well as the power to control the ore's marketing and direct the 
opening of a new mine.190 In addition, the government built new 
roads to the mine, hired employees to work there, gave draft defer­
ments to mine employees, managed the employees by instituting 
salaries and setting work weeks, and discouraged employees from 
leaving to work elsewhere.191 Later, when officials determined that 
Chemical, Ltd.; and the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology. See 
id. at 805. 
180. See id. 
181. See id. at 809. 
182. See id. at 811. See supra note 156 for an explanation of arranger liability. 
183. See id. at 808. The Vertae court borrowed heavily from FMC, quoting the 
extensive list of factors weighed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. See id. at 808­
09. See supra text accompanying note 165 for a list of the FMC factors. 
184. See id. at 809. 
185. See id. 
186. Id. (quoting FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't. of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 
844 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc». 
187. Id. 
188. 881 F. Supp. 1432 (E.D. Cal. 1995). This case involved a number of claims 
against the federal government and the State of California for both operator and ar­
ranger liability; however, the operator claim against the federal government is the only 
claim relevant to this Note. 
189. See id. at 1436. 
190. See id. 
191. See id. at 1449-50. 
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the mine polluted a local reservoir, the owners brought suit against 
the government, as an operator, to recover cleanup costS.192 
Citing FMC and Vertac, the court declined to hold the govern­
ment liable as an operator, stating that there was never any "hands­
on, day-to-day" control over operations at the facility.193 Accord­
ing to the Iron Mountain court, the government's actions in the 
present case amounted only to "encouragement and regulation."194 
In particular, the court noted three factors absent in this case that 
were present in FMC: (1) installation of an on-site representative, 
(2) leasing of, and control over, equipment used at the facility, and 
(3) direct control over waste disposal.195 
In Washington v. United States,196 the owner of a shipyard and 
the State of Washington brought suit against the federal govern­
ment claiming that it was the operator of a shipyard later found to 
have caused pollution.l97 The government's involvement with the 
facility included control and supervision of production by the place­
ment of on-site representatives, participation in the management 
and supervision of employees, the financing of the facility, control 
of costs, and knowledge of the hazardous waste production result­
ing from the facility's operation.198 
As in Iron Mountain, the court relied heavily upon "day-to­
day" actual control in its analysis, determining that the government 
could not be held liable as an operator.199 This court also analo­
gized heavily to FMC; however, as in Iron Mountain, the court 
found the situation to be distinguishable.2°O In Washington, the 
court found four primary distinguishing facts: (1) the absence of the 
War Production Board, (2) the fact that the shipyard continued to 
produce the same product while under government control, (3) the 
fact that the government never exercised its "authority" to seize the 
plant, and (4) the fact that FMC involved nationwide regulations 
allowing government control.201 
192. See id. at 1436. 
193. See id. at 1450 (citation omitted). See supra this Part for a discussion of the 
FMC and Vertae decisions. 
194. See id. 
195. Id. 
196. 930 F. Supp. 474 (w.n. Wash. 1996). As previously noted, this Note will 
focus only on the operator liability claim against the federal government. 
197. See id. at 475-76. 
198. See id. at 483-84. 
199. See id. at 483-85. 
200. See id. at 485. 
201. See id. 
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As can be seen from this review of cases, before the Supreme 
Court decided United States v. Besifoods,202 the courts' well-estab­
lished practice was to apply the multi-factor actual control test in 
the context of government operator liability. In general, a govern­
ment operator, like a parent corporation operator, was one that 
controlled the personnel, operations (particularly regarding waste 
disposal), and finances of the facility. However, despite these 
guidelines, no specific set of factors ever emerged, and courts con­
cerned about over-exposing governmental bodies to liability were 
able to manipulate. the existing, inherently malleable tests in order 
to prevent liability from attaching. The result was that many courts 
recognized government operator liability as a theoretical possibility, 
but few actually imposed it.203 
II. 	 BESTFOODS AND BEYOND: THE CURRENT STATE OF . 
GOVERNMENT OPERATOR LIABILITY 
A. 	 United States v. Bestfoods: The Supreme Court Re-Writes the 
Book-Or Does It? 
In 1998, after roughly 15 years of litigation regarding the 
proper test to apply for parent corporation operator liability cases, 
the United States Supreme Court provided a test in United States v. 
Bestfoods .204 The United States brought suit under CERCLA 
against, among other subsequent owners, CPC International, the 
parent corporation of the defunct Ott Chemical Company, to re­
cover the cost of cleanup operations at Ott's facility.205 In deter­
mining whether the parent corporation could be considered an 
"operator," the Supreme Court closely scrutinized the statutory 
definition of that term.206 After examining the common usage of 
202. 	 524 U.S. 51 (1998). 
203. See United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 808-09 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that plaintiffs had not shown sufficient government control to warrant liabil­
ity); United States v. Dart Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that the 
government may be held liable as an operator, but that in this case there had been 
nothing more than regulatory activity undertaken by the state); Washington, 930 F. 
Supp. at 482-85 (recognizing that government liability is possible, but refusing to im­
pose it based on the facts of the case); United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 
F. Supp. 1432, 1450-51 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (refusing to impose liability on the government 
based upon the facts of the case); United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 
869-70 (D. Del. 1989) (refusing to impose liability on a state government based upon an 
extensive list of required control factors). 
204. 	 524 U.S. 51 (1998). 
205. See id. 	at 56-58. 
206. 	 See id. at 66-67. 
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the word207 and its context in an "organizational sense,"208 the 
Supreme Court settled on the following definition: 
[U]nder CERCLA, an operator is simply someone who directs 
the workings of, manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility .... 
[A]n operator must manage, direct, or conduct operations specif­
ically related to pollution, that is, operations having to do with 
the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions about 
compliance with environmental regulations.209 
The Court also added that, in determining liability, one must con­
sider "whether, in degree and detail, actions directed to the facility 
by an agent of the parent alone are eccentric under accepted norms 
of parental oversight of a subsidiary's facility."21o The Court con­
spicuously declined to provide any further test by which to evaluate 
liability. Instead, the Court simply used the vague terms "manage," 
"direct," and "conduct," which are all subject to varying interpreta­
tions. In addition, the Court did not indicate whether this defini­
tion applied to government operator liability. 
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Bestfoods, there has 
been no clear determination by the lower courts as to whether this 
definition eliminates the need for additional operator tests.211 In 
the parent corporation context, a number of federal district courts 
have applied the Bestfoods definition without any reference to the 
traditional multi-factor tests.212 In Browning-Ferris Industries v. Ter 
Maat,213 the court held a business liable for its actions as an opera­
207. See id. at 66. The Court looked to the dictionary to determine the normal 
usage of the word, which stated: '''[t]o control the functioning of; run .... '" AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1268 (3d ed. 1992), and, '''to work; as, to operate a machine.'" 
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1707 (2d ed. 1958). 
208. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66. The Court stated that the "organizational 
sense" was more appropriately fitted to the CERCLA context and defined the term as: 
'''[t]o conduct the affairs of; manage: operate a business.'" AMERICAN HERITAGE DIC­
TIONARY, supra note 207, at 1268. 
209. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66-67. 
210. Id. at 72. 
211. Prior to Bestfoods, the courts of appeals had fashioned an extensive muiti­
factor "actual control" test to determine when parent corporations and government 
agencies were liable as operators. See supra Part 1.e.1 for a discussion of this test's 
genesis. The traditional test is not necessarily exclusive of the Bestfoods definition. 
However, prior to Bestfoods, lower courts focused less on a plain language definition of 
the term and more on various control factors that would show the defendant was an 
operator. See supra Part 1.e.1. The most general formulation of the test seems to be 
that an operator is one who controls the personnel, operations, and finances of a facil­
ity. See supra Part 1.e.1. 
212. See infra this Part for a discussion of these cases. 
213. 13 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
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tor at its sister corporation's facility.214 The Browning-Ferris court 
relied exclusively on the plain meaning of the word "operator."215 
Similarly, in United States v. Green,216 a New York district court 
denied a motion to strike an affirmative defense in which the de­
fendant217 argued that he had insufficient control over a facility to 
qualify him as an operator under CERCLA.218 Citing Best/oods, 
the court stated that the defendant could not be held liable unless 
he "directly participated in the management of the facility's pollu­
tion control operations including decisions pertaining to the dispo­
sal of hazardous substances and compliance with environmental 
regulations."219 The court made no mention of any traditional 
multi-factor tests. Finally, in Datron, Inc. v. eRA Holdings, Inc. ,220 
the district court found that.a business was not liable for a release 
caused by its subsidiary.221 Like Browning-Ferris and Green, the 
Datron court relied solely on the Best/oods definition, apparently 
forsaking the traditional tests.222 
In the government liability context, the courts' rulings have not 
been so homogenous. In fact, judges have aligned into two factions. 
One faction, typified by Judge Boggs in United States v. Township 0/ 
Brighton,223 favors a low threshold of evidence that focuses solely 
upon the general operator definition provided by the Supreme 
Court in Best/oods .224 This test does not expressly require the in­
tensive fact-finding involved in the traditional multi-factor tests. 
The other faction, consisting of Judges Moore and Dowd in Brigh­
214. See id. at 765. 
215. See id. at 763-64. The court found liability based upon actions taken by a 
joint officer (defendant Ter Maat) in the name of both corporations. See id. at 764-65. 
Among other things, Ter Maat, in his capacity as an officer for the sister corporation, 
took steps to procure a pollution control permit and conducted correspondence with 
the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. See id. 
216. 33 F. Supp. 2d 203 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 
217. In Green, the defendant was not a parent corporation but a sole shareholder. 
See id. at 209. 
218. See id. at 217. 
219. Id. 
220. 42 F. Supp. 2d 736 (W.D. Mich. 1999). 
221. See id. at 747-48. 
222. Despite the fact that an officer of the parent corporation sought environ­
mental liability coverage for the subsidiary, became involved in resolution of the EPA 
complaint, and assisted in obtaining an easement for a drainage pipe, the Datron court 
held that "[the parent's] involvement with the facilities falls soundly within the parame­
ters of normal oversight." Id. at 748. 
223. 153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998). 
224. See id. at 313-14. See supra text accompanying note 209 for the text of this 
definition. A New York district judge also adopted Judge Boggs' view in Delaney v. 
Town of Carmel, 55 F. Supp. 2d 237, 260-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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ton, defers to traditional multi-factor actual control tests.225 This 
high threshold requires that a plaintiff satisfy a fact-intensive in­
quiry characterized generally by control over personnel, finances, 
and operations at a given facility.226 
B. United States v. Township of Brighton227 
In Brighton, a court of appeals addressed the issue of govern­
ment operator liability under CERCLA for the first time. A three­
judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit heard the case. Judge Boggs wrote the opinion of the court, 
adopting the Best/oods definition of operator. Judge Moore con­
curred in the result, and Judge Dowd dissented in part and con­
curred in part. Both Judges Dowd and Moore argued that the 
traditional multi-factor tests were relevant in determining liability. 
1. Factual Background 
In 1960, the Township of Brighton, Michigan contracted with 
Vaughan Collett to use a portion of Collett's land as a municipal 
dump.228 The township contracted to have Collett control the eve­
ryday operations of the dump within specifications set by the town­
ship, for which Collett was to be paid a monthly fee.229 In 1965, 
Collett began having trouble maintaining the dump and asked the 
township for assistance.23o The township agreed to provide a bull­
dozer and to assist in eliminating some of the waste by having the 
Junior Fire Department burn it.231 
In the late 1960's, the State of Michigan began to regulate 
dumps more strictly and repeatedly warned the township that Col­
lett's property was not in compliance with waste disposal regula­
tions.232 In 1973, after it became apparent that the contamination 
could not be easily remedied, the township decided to close the 
dump.233 In 1989, a team of federal investigators examined the site 
225. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 322-31 (Moore, J., concurring); id. at 
331-35 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). 
226. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of the development of this test. 
227. 153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998). 
228. See id. at 310. 
229. See id. 
230. See id. at 311. 
231. See id. 
232. See id. 
233. See id. 
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and determined that it qualified for Superfund234 money.235 The 
United States undertook cleanup, and by 1995, the cost of cleanup 
had risen to approximately $500,000.236 The United States brought 
suit against Collett and the township to recover the response 
costS.237 After a bench trial, the district judge found the township 
liable.238 On appeal, the township raised four defenses to liability: 
(1) the hazardous wastes in question were confined to areas that 
were not part of the township's dump, (2) it was not an "operator" 
under CERCLA, (3) all hazardous wastes were contributed by 
sources not affiliated with the township, and (4) the district court 
erred in stating that the harm and costs were indivisible, thereby 
holding the township liable for the entire cost of response.239 
The court rejected the township's first and third defenses, hold­
ing that the entire property was a facility and that wastes had been 
mingled.240 As to the fourth issue, the court remanded for further 
action by the district court, noting that the lower court had made an 
insufficient factual inquiry to support its holding.241 This Note will 
next discuss the court's holding regarding the second defense. 
2. Judge Boggs' Opinion for the Court 
The Brighton court recognized the competing policy interests 
present in the case-the broad remedial purpose of CERCLA and 
the government's need to regulate waste disposal for the public's 
health and safety.242 Unable to determine from the record whether 
the township had exercised sufficient control to be deemed an oper­
ator under CERCLA,243 the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the 
district court for further findings of fact.244 
In providing guidance to the lower court, Judge Boggs advo­
cated an actual control test based largely upon the Supreme Court's 
234. For a discussion of the Superfund and its uses, see supra notes 24-25 and 
accompanying text. . 
235. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 311-12. 
236. See id. at 312. 
237. See id. 
238. See id. 
239. See id. This Note discusses only the second argument. 
240. See id. at 312-13 and 317, respectively. 
241. See id. at 319-20. The Sixth Circuit remanded with instructions that the dis­
trict court should make further factual determinations regarding the divisibility of the 
injury. See id. at 320. 
242. See id. at 315. 
243. See id. 
244. See id. at 322. 
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definition of operator in Bestfoods. 245 However, Judge Boggs ad­
ded that the party being subjected to liability need not have com­
mitted affirmative acts of pollution.246 It is sufficient to show that 
the party took affirmative steps to take control of a facility; subse­
quent inaction is no defense.247 
Judge Boggs also cited three cases, Nurad, Inc. v. William E. 
Hooper & Sons CO.,248 FMC Corp. v. United States Department of 
Commerce ,249 and United States v. Dart Industries, Inc. ,250 for the 
proposition that government operator liability is possible if regula­
tion of the facility in question is extensive enough.251 However, 
Judge Boggs failed to accept any of the previously used multi-factor 
liability tests.252 Rather, he stated that "mere regulation does not 
suffice to render a government entity liable, but actual operation 
(or 'macromanagement') does. "253 
245. See id. at 314 (citing United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998». See 
supra text accompanying note 209 for the Bestfoods definition of operator. Generally, 
this definition means that an operator is simply someone who "directs the workings of, 
manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility." Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66. 
246. See Township ofBrighton, 153 F.3d at 315. While there need not be affirma­
tive acts of pollution to hold a party responsible, that party will be held liable as long as 
it performed affirmative acts that made it an "operator" of the facility. See id. at 314­
15. 
247. See id. at 315. 
248. 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992). 
249. 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994). 
250. 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1988). 
251. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 314-15. 
252. Recall that the multi-factor test developed by the majority of the cases dis­
cussed in Part I.e.1 required satisfaction of a lengthy factual analysis to establish opera­
tor liability. Generally, such tests were predicated upon factors such as personnel, 
financial, and operational control. 
253. Township ofBrighton, 153 F.3d at 316. The United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York adopted Judge Boggs' view in Delaney v. Town of 
Carmel, 55 F. Supp. 2d 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), the only case after Brighton to address 
government operator liability. That case involved a contract between the DeLuca fam­
ily and the Town of Carmel which allowed the town to use a portion of the DeLucas' 
land to dump septic wastes. See id. at 241-42. The town paid rent, required that the 
property meet certain specifications, and maintained the roads leading to the dump site. 
See id. at 242. Following a complex series of transactions over two decades, the plain­
tiffs purchased property for development near the former dump site. See id. at 243-44. 
The New York State Departments of Health and Environmental Conservation in­
formed the plaintiffs that their wells were contaminated and should not be used. See id. 
at 244. The plaintiffs brought suit against a number of parties, including the town. See 
id. at 245. 
The court cited to Brighton, applying the Bestfoods definitional test without rely­
ing upon any particular set of factors. See id. at 260-61. After considering the facts of 
the case and comparing them to the similar facts in Brighton, the court simply stated 
that "[p]laintiffs offer no facts to show that Carmel exercised any ongoing control over 
the disposal activities at the Site." [d. at 261. Although the court briefly mentioned 
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3. Judge Moore's Concurring Opinion 
Judge Moore agreed with Judge Boggs' finding that there was 
insufficient evidence in the record to support a conclusive finding of 
operator liability.254 However, the concurrence also noted that 
Judge Boggs failed to provide a specific operator liability test.255 
Judge Moore emphasized that, while government bodies have an 
inherent burden to regulate waste disposal for the public health and 
safety, private entities have no such burden.256 To expose govern­
ment entities to excessive operator liability would '''have a chilling 
effect on long-term remedial efforts, since states may be unwilling 
to act when CERCLA liability is sure to be imposed."'257 Judge 
Moore stated that it may be unwise to use the same liability tests 
for both government and private actors.258 In addition, the concur­
rence noted that Judge Boggs' opinion provided insufficient gui­
dance to the lower courts regarding an operator liability test.259 
To resolve these problems, Judge Moore suggested adopting 
the test articulated in Rockwell International Corp. v. IU Interna­
tional Corp.260 Specifically, Judge Moore emphasized the govern­
ment's knowledge of the hazards caused by a facility's waste, 
participation in the facility's opening and closing, management and 
hiring of employees in areas relating to waste disposal, determina­
tion of operating plans, control over waste disposal, and public dec­
larations of responsibility for the facility.261 
4. Judge Dowd's Dissent 
Judge Dowd stated that the facts on the record were insuffi­
cient to hold the government liable as an operator.262 Judge Dowd, 
some of the traditional control factors (operational and personnel control), it made no 
indication that any of them could be determinative. See id. Instead, the court simply 
noted that none of the potential factors had been met. See id. Thus, Delaney is not 
particularly useful for the analysis of this Note, as the district judge failed to clarify why 
he chose one test over the other. 
254. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 323-28 (Moore, J., concurring). 
255. See id. at 325 (Moore, J., concurring). 
256. See id. at 324 (Moore, J., concurring). 
257. [d. (Moore, J., concurring) (quoting Olsen, supra note 2, at 204). 
258. See id. (Moore, J., concurring). 
259. See id. at 325 (Moore, J., concurring). 
260. 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390-91 (N.D. Ill. 1988); see also Township of Brighton, 
153 F.3d at 327 (Moore, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Stringfellow, [1990] 20 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,656, 20,658 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1990) (citing Rockwell 
Int'l Corp. v. IV Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390-91 (N.D. Ill. 1988»). See supra 
notes 78-84 and accompanying text for· a discussion of Rockwell. 
261. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 327 (Moore, J., concurring). 
262. See id. at 331 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). 
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like Judge Boggs, stated that the Bestfoods standard is the control­
ling law in cases of government liability and parent corporation lia­
bility.263 However, Judge Dowd stated that the multi-factor actual 
control tests adopted in cases like FMC, Dart, and New Castle are 
consistent with the Bestfoods definition of operator liability.264 Ac­
cordingly, the dissent stated that the township should be absolved 
from operator liability because "there are no facts to indicate that 
Brighton Township hired the employees of the dump, had the au­
thority to supervise or fire them, or managed the finances of the 
dump."265 Additionally, Judge Dowd found it dispositive to liabil­
ity that the township did not control "daily operations" at the 
facility.266 
III. A MODIFIED VERSION OF THE MULTI-FACTOR TESTS Is 
THE ApPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR GOVERNMENT 
OPERATOR LIABILITY 
Following United States v. Bestfoods ,267 the state of the law re­
garding government operator liability remains unclear. On one side 
of the argument lie the concurrence and dissent in United States v. 
Township of Brighton,268 which follow the long CERCLA tradition 
of predicating operator liability upon extensive multi-factor control 
tests.269 Although the concurrence and the dissent regarded 
Bestfoods as controlling, they argued that the traditional tests are 
consistent with Bestfoods.270 
263. See id. at 333 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). 
264. See id. at 334 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). 
265. Id. (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). 
266. See id. at 335 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). 
267. 524 U.S. 51 (1998). 
268. 153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998). 
269. See supra Part I.e.l for a discussion of the development of these tests and 
the factors the courts applied. Perhaps the most extreme example of the protracted 
multi-factor test is Washington v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 474 (W.D. Wash. 1996), in 
which a federal district court declined to impose liability on the government, citing a 
staggeringly specific and demanding list of necessary control factors. First, the Wash­
ington court invoked the factors from FMC Corp. v. United States Department of Com­
merce, 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc), which included "active involvement" in a 
plant's operation, government control of the product being created, levels of produc­
tion, product price, and to whom the product would be sold. See id. at 843. The Wash­
ington court then distinguished FMC: (1) the War Production Board was absent in 
Washington, (2) the government in Washington did not force the facility to make a 
product it otherwise would not have made, (3) the government lacked authority to seize 
the plant, and (4) in FMC, a system of nationwide regulation was affected. See Wash­
ington, 930 F. Supp. at 485. 
270. In the Brighton concurrence, Judge Moore stated, "I believe that Judge 
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Judge Boggs' opinion in Brighton offers the counter-argument 
to the multi-factor tests. Judge Boggs discarded the long-standing 
multi-factor tests and relied solely upon the definition offered by 
Bestfoods.271 Thus, the question remains whether government op­
erator liability should be determined by Judge Boggs' less demand­
ing Bestfoods definitional test or by the more demanding 
traditional multi-factor tests. In answering this question, this Note 
will first argue that the Bestfoods test is controlling in the govern­
ment operator liability context. Next, this Note will consider the 
policy arguments surrounding government operator liability. Fi­
nally, this Note will apply the policy considerations to the two tests 
and synthesize a workable liability standard. 
A. 	 Does the Bestfoods Standard Apply to Government Operator 
Liability? 
In Bestfoods, the United States Supreme Court set the stan­
dard for parent corporation operator liability under CERCLA.272 
Significantly, the Supreme Court did not explicitly place any limita­
tion on when this definition would apply. Thus, it may reasonably 
be argued that courts should apply the definition in both the gov­
ernmental and non-governmental contexts.273 There is clear prece-
Boggs fails to define [the actual control] standard clearly so as to provide the lower 
courts with direct guidance as to when a government entity engages in regulatory activi­
ties extensive enough to make it an operator of the facility in question." Township of 
Brighton, 153 F.3d at 325 (Moore, J., concurring). Judge Moore went on to advocate a 
return to the multi-factor test as applied in United States v. Stringfellow, [1990] 20 Envtl. 
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,656, 20,658 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1990). See Township ofBrigh­
ton, 153 F.3d at 327 (Moore, J., concurring). In dissent, Judge Dowd stated that the 
court should rely heavily upon the test elaborated in FMC and other multi-factor test 
cases. See id. at 333-34 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). In addition, 
Judge Dowd noted that "[a]lthough [numerous multi-factor control test cases] were de­
cided prior to the Bestfoods case, they are completely in line with Bestfoods' holding." 
Id. at 334 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). 
271. See Township ofBrighton, 153 F.3d at 333 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, con­
curring in part). In Bestfoods, the Supreme Court stated: 
[U]nder CERCLA, an operator is simply someone who directs the workings 
of, manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility .... [A]n operator must man­
age, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to pollution, that is, op­
erations having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or 
decisions about compliance with environmental regulations. 
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66-67. 
272. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 67-70. See supra note 271 for the Bestfoods defi­
nition of "operator." 
273. This seems to be one issue on which all three of the Brighton opinions agree, 
as they each state Bestfoods is controlling on the issues of corporate and government 
liability. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 314 (expressly adopting the Bestfoods 
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dent for the proposition that a rule which applies to private actors 
must apply equally to government actors.274 Thus, it appears that 
Best/oods provides the appropriate standard for both parent corpo­
ration and government liability. However, as discussed in the fol­
lowing sections, there are policy considerations applicable to 
government agencies that are not applicable to private actors.275 
Although Best/oods appears to be the applicable standard, it is not 
clear what implications this decision has for government operator 
liability. 
B. 	 What Exactly Does the Bestfoods Definition Require to 
Establish Government Liability? 
The Best/oods Court conspicuously failed to follow the stan­
dard practice of the lower courts276 when it declined to use a multi­
factor test and instead applied a simple, common usage definition 
of operator.277 However, the Court left open the question of 
whether the definition forecloses the use of multi-factor tests in de­
termining operator liability. To date, this issue has only been ad­
dressed by one federal court of appeals, in United States v. 
Township 0/ Brighton.278 Brighton illustrated that courts could rea­
definition); id. at 325 (Moore, J., concurring) (citing to Best/oods definition); id. at 333 
(Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) ("I find that the Best/oods standard 
should be applied to both the corporate form and the governmental entity situations."). 
274. See, e.g., FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843 (stating that "[u]nder [CERCLA] sec­
tion 120 [the state] is in the same position 'as any nongovernmental entity' with respect 
to CERCLA liability"); Thiokol Corp. v. Department of Treasury, 987 F.2d 376, 382 
(6th Cir. 1993) (stating that "CERCLA also expressly provides that states are to be 
treated in exactly the same manner as nongovernmental owner/operators ... including 
liability"). But see supra note 203 for a discussion of cases in which the courts have not 
imposed government liability. The cases discussed in note 203 have, in practice, created 
a higher hurdle to government liability; however, none of them expressly indicated that 
the standard is any higher than that which must be applied to corporate actors. In 
short, it appears that the courts recognize that there is no statutory support for diverse 
requirements, yet they remain reluctant to hold government agencies liable. 
275. 	 See infra Part III.C for a discussion of these policy considerations. 
276. As noted earlier, courts evaluating government operator liability, like those 
evaluating corporate liability, have consistently advocated multi-factor tests. See, e.g., 
United States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 1995); FMC Corp., 29 
F.3d at 843-45; United States v. Dart Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1988); 
Washington v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 474, 482-85 (W.D. Wash. 1996); United 
States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1449-50 (E.D. Cal. 1995); 
United States v. Stringfellow, [1990] 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,656, 20,658 
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1990); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 731 F. Supp. 783, 788 
(W.D. Mich. 1989); United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 869-70 (D. 
Del. 1989). 
277. 	 See supra note 271 for the Best/oods definition of operator. 
278. 	 153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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son ably disagree on the issue. Writing for the majority, Judge 
Boggs held that the Bestfoods test required nothing more than af­
firmative acts indicating actual control and adopted that standard as 
the exclusive test for operator liability.279 In contrast, the concur­
rence280 and dissent281 both agreed that, although the Bestfoods 
definition is applicable, it is nothing more than a guideline and that 
courts must consider additional factors to give the definition mean­
ing on a case-by-case basis. 
It is essential at this point to determine whether the Bestfoods 
Court intended for its decision to reinforce the status quo (minimal 
government liability) or open new doors to government liability. 
Having failed to answer this question expressly, the Supreme Court 
forces the lower courts to examine the two traditional, conflicting 
policy arguments relating to government liability: enforcing the 
broad remedial purpose of CERCLA and protecting government 
bodies from excessive liability. 
C. 	 Enforcing the Broad Remedial Purpose v. Discouraging 
Government Regulation: The Competing Policy 
Considerations 
The competing policy interests of CERCLA's broad remedial 
purpose and the public interest in avoiding creation of a disincen­
tive for government environmental regulation are pivotal to the 
question of whether to apply the multi-factor tests or the simplified 
Bestfoods test. Careful consideration of these interests indicates 
that government actors may deserve special treatment in the appli­
cation of the operator liability provision of CERCLA.282 
279. 	 See id. at 314. 
280. 	 See id. at 325-27 (Moore, J., concurring). 
281. 	 See id. at 333-35 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). 
282. Some areas of special government treatment are found in the text of CER­
CLA itself. For example, state and local governments cannot be held liable for emer­
gency actions taken to remedy releases or threatened releases from a third party's 
facility. See 42 U.S.c. § 9607(d)(2) (1994). This section clearly recognizes (at least to a 
limited degree) that there should be some grace granted to government agencies in light 
of their regulatory capacity. In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) indicates that the 
government does not become an operator when it acquires ownership of a facility 
through "bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other circumstances in which 
the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of its function as sovereign." Id. 
However, the courts have been slow to carve out exceptions to other types of CERCLA 
liability for government agencies. See, e.g., Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Wash­
ington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 66 F.3d 669 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding owner and op­
erator liability when a publicly owned sewer system leaked hazardous chemicals); B.F. 
Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding arranger liability for 
municipalities that disposed of household waste); Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle 
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1. The Broad Remedial Purpose 
Environmental contamination is indeed a problem of "national 
magnitude. "283 A large portion of the hazardous waste in the 
United States is improperly disposed of, often in poorly-operated 
landfills.284 In fact, in the early 1980's, the EPA found that more 
than sixty percent of all landfills were not in compliance with gov­
ernment environmental regulations, and over twenty percent were 
found to have already caused contamination to air or water.285 In 
addition, the EPA estimated that seventy-three million Americans 
lived in close proximity to a contaminated facility.286 These num­
bers have skyrocketed; a more recent study estimates that over 
eighty-five percent of Superfund sites have contaminated adjoining 
waterS,287 and that seventy million Americans live within four miles 
of a CERCLA site.288 The United States is indeed "neck-deep in 
waste. "289 
In passing CERCLA, to ease the burden of cleanup, "Congress 
intended that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal 
of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying 
the harmful conditions they created."290 Accordingly, throughout 
CERCLA's history courts have consistently recognized that the 
statute is designed to provide a broad base of liable parties.291 In 
the parent corporation context, the courts have repeatedly upheld a 
corporate liability standard that extends far beyond traditional 
County, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding government owner liability for a release at 
a public landfill). 
283. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. 
Minn. 1982). 
284. See Ferrey, supra note 10, at 211. 
285. See id. 
286. See Lucia Ann Silecchia, Pinning the Blame and Piercing the Veil in the Mists 
of Metaphor: The Supreme Court's New Standards for the CERCLA Liability of Parent 
Companies and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 115, 117 
(1998) (citing Marc D. Potson, Comment, Redefining CERCLA Arranger Liability: 
Making the Responsible Party Pay, 3 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'y REv., 216, 216 (1990». 
287. See McCrory, supra note 39, at 60 (citing KATHERINE N. PROBST ET AL., 
FOOTING THE BILL FOR SUPERFUND CLEANUPS: WHO PAYS AND How? 20, 24 (1995». 
288. See id. (citing Superfund Reassessment and Reauthorization: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Superfund, Waste Control, and Risk Assessment of the Senate Comm. 
on Env't and Pub. Works, 104th Congo 428 (1995) and U.S. EPA Synopsis: Superfund 
Administrative Reforms, Annual Report Fiscal Year 1996 (1996». 
289. See Ferrey, supra note 10, at 200. 
290. United States V. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. 
Minn. 1982). 
291. See supra note 2 for examples of the courts' recognition of the broad reme­
dial purpose in the context of determining liability. 
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common law practices.292 However, the question remains whether 
this type of policy consideration must extend to government actors. 
Courts and commentators have generally agreed that the broad 
remedial purpose is sufficient to justify holding government actors 
liable under CERCLA.293 However, there remains a legitimate ar­
gument that any form of government liability violates the broad re­
medial purpose. As noted earlier, CERCLA's goal is to make the 
polluter pay.294 In the corporate context this liability scheme is an 
effective means of ensuring that the controlling parent corporation 
does not escape liability. However, when the government pays for 
cleanup, the taxpayer-not some distant third party-is stuck with 
the bill.295 One could argue that this view is flawed because, in a 
democratic government, decisiops are made by elected officials.296 
If the taxpayers elect officials who pollute, perhaps the voters 
should pay for their error in judgment. In effect, each taxpayer 
would become a parent of the elected government. However, this 
argument ignores the fact that, unlike a parent corporation, the 
public does not have the ability to control the day-to-day acts of 
those people it places in power. A parent corporation may immedi­
ately, and often with minimal formality, influence and overturn dis­
favored decisions made by subordinates. Voters, on the other hand, 
must wait until the next round of elections. In addition, voters only 
wield power when acting as a group, unlike a parent corporation. 
292. See Stewart & Campbell, supra note 3, at 7. See also supra notes 34-37 and 
accompanying text for further discussion of CERCLA's broad liability scheme. 
293. See Steven G. Davison, Governmental Liability Under CERCLA, 25 B.C. 
ENVIL. AFr. L. REv. 47, 127 (1997) (stating that government actors should be held 
liable in the same circumstances as private actors); Ferrey, supra note 10, at 273-74 
(noting that, given CERCLA's purpose, it would be inequitable to treat government 
bodies, specifically municipalities, different than private actors); Williamson & Mc­
Cann, supra note 4, at 438 (arguing that government immunity from CERCLA liability 
would be inconsistent with Congress' intent in passing CERCLA). But see Olsen, supra 
note 2, at 204 (noting that although government liability is a legal reality, the courts 
should be careful not to impose such liability without consideration of the 
consequences). 
294. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the broad remedial purpose. 
295. See Carley, supra note 26, at 105 ("When viewed in the context of the 
United States as the 'polluter,' the basic policy goals of CERCLA are not furthered, as 
the government does not pay; the taxpayer does."). In addition, liable corporations are 
able to internalize the cost of cleanup by increasing prices. Government agencies that 
do not make a profit from their regulatory activities have no way to dilute the effects of 
cleanup costs other than to raise taxes. See also Tricia R. Russo, FMC Corp. v. United 
States Department of Commerce: An Overexpansion of "Operator" Liability Under 
CERCLA,7 VILL. ENVIL. L.J. 157, 178-79 (1996). 
296. Except, of course, that administrative officials are appointed by elected 
representatives. 
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Thus, there is a serious question whether any form of government 
operator liability supports the ideal of making the polluter pay. 
On the other hand, some commentators have supported similar 
treatment for government and private actors by citing the practical 
effects of such liability. Commentators have noted three primary 
reasons why CERCLA parent corporation liability supplants the 
common law of limited liability: (1) possible liability encourages the 
actor to closely regulate environmental compliance practices, (2) li­
ability discourages potential actors from assuming the corporate 
form for no other reason than to avoid liability, and (3) strict liabil­
ity reduces transaction costs associated with many common law re­
quirements of pleading and proof.297 The first and third reasons 
may apply to government actors as well as private actors.298 The 
public maintains a legitimate interest in having its governmental 
bodies properly organize and manage their waste· facilities, and 
transaction costs are reduced by strict liability in the government 
context as well as in the private sphere. However, these arguments 
provide weak support for government liability. Although there is a 
public interest in properly managed waste facilities, government lia­
bility may actually discourage government regulation.299 Also, a re­
duction in transaction costs, while generally beneficial, loses its 
luster when it imposes liability in situations where liability would 
otherwise be inappropriate. 
Clearly, there are strong arguments that indiscriminate govern­
ment liability does not support CERCLA's broad remedial pur­
pose. However, despite any weight these arguments may carry, the 
courts seem unprepared to eliminate government liability alto­
gether. Instead, they appear to favor such liability on a limited ba­
sis. To understand the courts' reluctance to impose government 
liability it is essential to consider the dangers of overexposure to 
operator liability. 
2. 	 Government Overexposure: Burdening the Sovereign and 
Creating a Disincentive to Regulate 
Unlike private actors, governmental bodies "possess and exer­
cise regulatory power in their capacity as guardians of the public 
297. See Stewart & Campbell, supra note 3, at 8. 
298. The second clearly does not apply, since businesses cannot assume a govern­
mental form to escape liability. 
299. See infra Part III.C.2 for a discussion of how imposing government liability 
could discourage involvement in waste disposal. 
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health, safety, and welfare."300 Thus, it is common for government 
involvement in the waste disposal process to be predicated upon the 
responsibilities the government actor bears as the sovereign.301 For 
example, municipalities are almost invariably involved, either as di­
rect participants or on a contractual basis, with the removal and 
disposal of household (and sometimes industrial) waste.302 As a re­
sult, if courts began to impose liability on governmental bodies fre­
quently, those agencies could be unduly burdened by cleanup 
costS.303 
The Iron Mountain court found such arguments unconvincing, 
stating that CERCLA's broad liability scheme does require private 
parties to clean up hazards created by other parties.304 However, 
the parent corporation role in waste cleanup is not analogous to 
that of governmental bodies. The essential difference is that the 
government's role is not voluntary, whereas the private actor's con­
duct is voluntary.305 Thus, it appears unfair to burden the govern­
ment with liability based solely upon mandatory actions taken in a 
regulatory function; the corporate actor faces no such similar 
threat. 
The Brighton concurrence noted one commentator's concern 
that overexposing governmental bodies to liability could create a 
disincentive to undertake any environmental regulation.306 Such an 
300. United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 324 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(Moore, J., concurring). 
301. See id. (Moore, J., concurring) (stating that "[g]overnmental entities increas­
ingly are exercising their regulatory power in an effort to address the environmental 
problems created by the release of hazardous materials"). 
302. See Ferrey, supra note 10, at 233 (noting that municipalities in particular are 
almost always engaged in some liability-creating conduct relating to the removal and 
disposal of household and industrial wastes). At times, even this apparently benign 
involvement may lead to liability. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 
1206 (2d Cir. 1992) (denying motion for summary judgment by municipalities claiming 
immunity from arranger liability for disposal of normal household waste). 
303. See Ferrey, supra note 10, at 274 (stating that municipalities would face a 
potentially immense financial burden under CERCLA liability predicated upon waste 
removal). 
304. See United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1445 
(E.D. Cal. 1995) ("CERCLA does encourage private cleanup of pollution caused by 
others by exposing current owners to liability and at the same time providing them with 
a cause of action for the recovery of their costs."). 
305. In other words, the sovereign does not "choose" to have regulatory con­
trol-such control is normally mandated. On the other hand, the private actor has 
control over whether to engage in the waste-producing activity or whether to purchase 
a piece of polluted property. 
306. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 324 (Moore, J., concurring) (quoting, 
Olsen, supra note 2, at 204 (stating that "widespread state liability may have a chilling 
262 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:221 
influence could reduce necessary government involvement in envi­
ronmental protection-certainly a result incompatible with the 
broad remedial purpose of preserving the environment.307 Another 
commentator indicated that increasing government liability could 
have a financial, as well as environmental, impact.30B The cost of 
liability would result in higher property taxes, and "[a]s a result, 
current property taxpayers would indemnify [potentially responsi­
ble] municipalities for past waste disposal practices . . . . "309 
D. 	 Evaluating the Alternative Bestfoods Interpretations and 
Synthesizing a Workable Test for Government Liability 
For the reasons already discussed, governmental bodies should 
be treated differently than corporations.310 However, both the 
traditional multi-factor tests and the Bestfoods definition fail to 
properly balance the applicable policy considerations with the need 
for a practical, consistent test for government operator liability. 
This Note will now evaluate the shortcomings of each test and syn­
thesize a workable liability standard. 
1. 	 The Traditional Multi-Factor Tests Are Ineffective 
Because They Are too Easily Manipulated and 
Unpredictable 
Because courts using multi-factor tests have frequently recog­
effect on long-term remedial efforts, since states may be unwilling to act when CER­
CLA liability is sure to be imposed"»; ct. Carley, supra note 26, at 102 ("If the federal 
government were held liable for its attempts to clean up hazardous waste sites, the 
government would not engage in such activities."). 
307. One commentator has noted that this theory could also apply to parent cor­
porations, by discouraging them from becoming involved in their subsidiaries' waste 
management activities. See Silecchia, supra note 286, at 178-84. However, Silecchia 
goes on to refute this argument, noting that there are five primary reasons that parent 
corporation liability would not reduce involvement in waste disposal activities: (1) The 
parent's financial ties to .the subsidiary encourage participation, (2) corporations may 
often have subsidiaries large enough to handle waste management independently, (3) 
parent corporations that own all of a subsidiary's stock will automatically exercise a 
great deal of liability-creating control over management whether or not they actively 
participate in waste disposal, (4) the parent will have an incentive to avoid environmen­
tal litigation for the purposes of avoiding bad publicity, and (5) the expansive liability 
scheme provided by Best/oods will encourage corporations to develop new waste dispo­
sal technologies. See id. 
308. 	 See Ferrey, supra note 10, at 274-76. 
309. Id. at 274; see also Russo, supra note 295, at 179-80 ("[FMC) has paved the 
way for enormous governmental liability which will ultimately be paid with taxpayer 
dollars."); Carley, supra note 26, at 95 ("Although it is difficult to estimate the financial 
impact on the government of the [FMC court's finding of government liability], it is 
clear that the cost will be significant. "). 
310. 	 See supra Part III.e. 
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nized the possibility of government liability, but have imposed it 
sparingly, it may seem that they have been approaching the prob­
lem correctly all along. After all, at first glance such an approach 
appears to give governmental bodies appropriate protection. How­
ever, multi-factor tests are hopelessly malleable and unpredictable, 
providing little guidance to courts or government actors. 
The multi-factor tests' shortcomings become clear upon consid­
eration of the holdings in United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, 
Inc. 311 and Washington v. United States.312 Both Iron Mountain and 
Washington featured fact patterns quite similar in substance to 
FMC Corp. v. United States Department of Commerce,313 in which 
the appellate court found liability. However, both district courts 
rejected government liability, citing the absence of factors not men­
tioned in previous cases.314 
In FMC, probably the most cited case on government operator 
liability, the court adhered roughly to the employee/operational/fi­
nancial control test, but added more specific factors that it called 
"the leading indicia of control."315 The Iron Mountain court, de­
spite the presence of considerable evidence of control,316 failed to 
find liability based upon a series of three factors, two of which it 
found were established by FMC.317 Even more dramatic is the 
court's failure in Washington to find liability despite overwhelming 
evidence of control.318 In Washington, the court dismissed what 
have normally been considered the truly important indicia. Instead, 
the Court relied on a set of four unusual factors, including two re­
garding the relevance in FMC of the War Production Board and 
311. 881 F. Supp. 1432 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
312. 930 F. Supp. 474 (W.D. Wash. 1996). 
313. 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994). 
314. See supra Part I.C.2.b for a discussion of the holdings and tests applied in the 
Iron Mountain and Washington cases. 
315. See FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843. For a list of these indicia, see supra text 
accompanying note 161. 
316. See supra text accompanying notes 189-191. 
317. See supra text accompanying note 195 for a list of those factors. The third 
factor, control over waste disposal, has clearly been established by a majority of cases 
discussed in this Note. See supra Part I.C.2.b. However, it is interesting that the Iron 
Mountain court chose to discuss it in relation to FMC. In FMC, the court found that 
the government had knowledge of disposal techniques, understood that increased pro­
duction meant increased waste, and provided some disposal equipment. See supra 
notes 144-152. With the exception of providing equipment, these factors seem to be 
present in Iron Mountain as well. See supra notes 189-195. 
318. See supra text accompanying note 198 for a discussion of this evidence. 
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national regulation,319 the fact that the shipyard was making the 
same product,320 and the fact that the facility was never seized. 
What appears to be happening is that each successive case declines 
to find liability based on some factor established in the previous 
case, preventing government liability even where substantial con­
trol is evident.321 
This case-by-case addition of factors invites judicial improvisa­
tion and makes the traditional multi-factor tests completely unpre­
dictable.322 As revealed by Iron Mountain and Washington, liability 
depends upon the inclinations of the individual judges. Accord­
ingly, one commentator has noted that the multi-factor tests result 
in an "adhoc factual analysis [that] may subject states to open­
ended liability if the courts are not willing to closely examine the 
particular state's alleged involvement at [the] ... site."323 History 
has proven this prediction incorrect (as the multi-factor tests' flexi­
319. Although, the court never explains what relevance this has and why it is 
determinative. 
320. However, it is obviously a questionable assertion that the shipyard would 
otherwise have been producing mine-sweepers for private industrial consumption. 
321. The list began to grow immediately following United States v. Dart Indus., 
Inc., 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1988). In that case, the court gave little guidance, simply 
requiring "hands on" activities. See id. at 146. The following year, the court in United 
States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854 (D. Del. 1989), built upon the theoretical 
foundation of Dart, but added an extensive list of factors to be considered. See id. at 
869. Later, in FMC Corp. v. United States Department of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 843 
(3d Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Third Circuit cited to New Castle, but added a new list of 
factors that it called the "leading indicia of control." Id. The court used these factors to 
impose liability upon the government. See id. at 844-45. The court in United States v. 
Vertact Chemical Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 807-09 (8th Cir. 1995), drew upon the FMC factors 
(apparently regarding certain of them as determinative) to find the government not 
liable. In United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1430, 1449-50 (E.D. 
Cal. 1995), a federal district court failed to find government liability because the facts of 
the present case did not match up to the overwhelming indicia of control in FMC. Fi­
nally, in Washington v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 474,485 (W.O. Wash. 1996), a federal 
district court refused to find government liability based upon four arcane "determina­
tive" factors established in FMC. See supra text accompanying note 201 for a list of 
these factors. 
322. This trend toward an increasingly long list of specific factors has effectively 
shielded the government from operator liability, possibly to the point of violating CER­
CLA's broad remedial purpose. By continuously adding to the list of necessary factors, 
the courts have raised the evidentiary burden of parties seeking government liability. 
Of course, the more factors that are added, the more difficult it is to show that those 
factors have been satisfied. In addition, Iron Mountain and Washington illustrate a 
developing trend toward regarding the factors as determinative, rather than cumulative, 
despite the fact that courts have repeatedly stated that the test is the totality of the 
circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 327 (6th 
Cir. 1998) (Moore, J., concurring); New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. at 869. 
323. Olsen, supra note 2, at 204. 
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bility has weighed for, not against, the government), but commenta­
tors still generally agree that a greater degree of certainty in 
assigning liability would be desirable.324 
One positive aspect of the multi-factor tests is that, if applied 
consistently, they offer a detailed and useful standard for liability. 
The problem is that they have not been applied consistently. Fur­
thermore, the list of potential factors has become so long and con­
voluted that it would be insufficient to simply state that the multi­
factor tests are controlling. One would have to determine which 
incarnation of the test is applicable. 
2. 	 The Best/oods Definition Could Over-Expose the 
Government to Liability and Is too Vague to 
Serve as an Adequate Liability Standard 
As the standard with the lower evidentiary burden (due to the 
lack of specific facts that must be proven to establish liability), the 
Best/oods definition is the test most likely to overexpose the gov­
ernment to liability. The Best/oods Court simply stated that "an 
operator must manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically re­
lated to pollution."325 One could argue that this test covers, by def­
inition, every regulatory act taken by a governmental body. 
However, imposing absolute government liability would clearly be 
contrary to Congress' intent in passing CERCLA.326 It is therefore 
reasonable to conclude that the Supreme Court intended to create a 
more discriminating liability standard than absolute liability. 
On the other hand, one could argue that the Best/oods require­
ment for affirmative acts precludes the possibility that a govern­
ment actor could be held liable for mere regulation. In fact, the 
Supreme Court specifically stated that an operator is one who "di­
rects the workings of, manages, or conducts the affairs of a facil­
ity."327 This, in conjunction with the requirement that control must 
specifically relate to contamination,328 could give the government 
324. See id. See generally Davison, supra note 293, at 127 (concluding that gov­
ernment liability should be equivalent to private actor liability); Ferrey, supra note 10, 
at 274-75 (stating that equity demands an even-handed approach to assigning liability); 
Williamson & McCann, supra note 4, at 440-41 (noting that courts, when left to their 
own devices, have a tendency to drift into "peripheral matters" rather than focus on the 
important indicia of control). 
325. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66 (1998). 
326. See Williamson & McCann, supra note 4, at 443 (stating that Congress' in­
tent was to only place liability upon "truly responsible parties"). 
327. Best/oods, 524 U.S. at 66. 
328. See id. 
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ample protection against unwarranted liability. It should also be 
noted that in the one circuit case where the new definitional test has 
been applied, it has been used to question a lower court's finding of 
municipal liability.329 Still, because the Best/oods definition does 
not rely on factors, the courts will lose the ability to raise the evi­
dentiary burden against government actors. Consequently, they 
will lose the ability to give governmental bodies adequate protec­
tion from excessive liability. 
The Best/oods definition is also far too vague to serve as a use­
fulliability standard. One commentator has called the language of 
the Best/oods definition broad and "susceptible to varying interpre­
tations," noting that a number of words used by the Supreme 
Court including "manage" "direct" and "conduct" are no more , " 
helpful than the word "operate," as used in CERCLA's statutory 
language.33o With only this vague guidance, it is inevitable that 
courts will eventually revert to the old practice of relying on multi­
factor tests. However, for better or worse, Best/oods is now the 
controlling law. Thus, in order to follow the Supreme Court's hold­
ing in that case, the lower courts will have to apply tests that take 
into consideration the Best/oods definition. 
3. Synthesizing a Workable Test for Liability 
The multi-factor tests, as applied by courts in the past, appear 
too malleable and unpredictable.331 In addition, they appear to cre­
ate an unreasonably high bar to government liability. On the other 
hand, the Best/oods definition is nebulous and vague, offering little 
guidance to courts faced with determining government liability. 
This test may also provide government actors with insufficient pro­
tection from excessive liability. However, there is a way to combine 
the best parts of the Best/oods definition and the traditional multi­
factor tests to synthesize a workable standard for liability that also 
addresses the need for certainty. 
Best/oods should be read as advocating a multi-factor test; 
however, unlike the Brighton concurrence's332 and dissent's333 
readings of Best/oods, the Supreme Court's mandate should not be 
329. See United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 319-21 (6th Cir. 
1998). 
330. See Silecchia, supra note 286, at 176-77. 
331. See supra note 106 for examples of the courts' inconsistent applications and 
divergent interpretations of these tests. 
332. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 327 (Moore, J., concurring). 
333. See id. at 334 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in p~rt). 
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read as a reversion to the traditional test. As noted earlier, the 
traditional multi-factor tests, like the Best/oods definitional test, al­
low courts far too much leeway in determining not only liability, but 
the standard for finding liability.334 In fact, the very vagueness of 
the Supreme Court's definition in Best/oods indicates that the 
Court must have intended for the definition to be used in conjunc­
tion with some other method of liability determination.335 To take 
the vague Best/oods definition at face value would be an exercise in 
futility without some deference to a more conclusive list of factors. 
Still, the fact that the Court failed to recognize established prece­
dent indicates that the Court did not intend a return to the old 
multi-factor tests. 
There is sufficient language in Best/oods to establish a new, 
more conclusive, multi-factor test. The Supreme Court first stated 
that "an operator is simply someone who directs the workings of, 
manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility."336 This seems suffi­
cient to establish a requirement for affirmative acts, effectively 
eliminating a test based on authority to control. 
Next, the Court indicated that the actor must be involved in 
"operations specifically related to pollution."337 This is a clear re­
quirement that the actor have operational control, one of the three 
traditional factors in the multi-factor tests.338 However, this leaves 
open the question of what constitutes operational control. The 
Court addressed this concern and indicated that the operations 
must be those "having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazard­
ous waste, or decisions about compliance with environmental regu­
lations."339 This reveals that the operational control must 
specifically relate to waste disposal. Although this could include 
such factors as personnel and financial control (factors used by 
courts prior to Best/oods) , the test would only be satisfied if the 
control specifically related to waste disposal.340 
334. See supra notes 323-324 and accompanying text for a discussion of commen­
tators' criticisms of this test. 
335. One commentator has noted that the Bestfoods decision left two significant 
issues regarding operator liability undecided: (1) "how 'operator' should be defined for 
purposes of assessing direct liability," and (2) "how the definition of 'operator' may 
best be applied." Silecchia, supra note 286, at 122. In fact, Silecchia argued that these 
questions are best handled by the legislature, not the courts. See id. at 178. 
336. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66 (1998). 
337. Id. 
338. The other two factors are control over personnel and control over finances. 
For further discussion of the development of this test, see supra Part I.e. 
339. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66-67. 
340. For example, suppose a municipality contracted for the operation of a land­
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Finally, once a court determines that such operational control 
exists, it must consider whether the control was "eccentric under 
accepted norms" of governmental regulatory oversight.341 If so, it 
is clear that the government has overstepped its bounds as the sov­
ereign and has undertaken the role of "operator." 
Thus, Bestfoods seems to advocate a new three-part test re­
quiring: (1) affirmative acts of control over the facility, (2) opera­
tional control relating directly to the disposal of hazardous waste, 
and (3) evidence that such control was above and beyond the gov­
ernment's normal regulatory power. 
4. 	 Applying the New Test to Government Operator 
Liability Cases 
Applying this new test to some of the factual scenarios dis­
cussed in this Note, it becomes clear that this synthesis achieves a 
just result that balances CERCLA's competing policy interests.342 
Under the new test, the majority of decisions reached by the 
courts are correct. For example, United States v. Iron Mountain 
Mines, Inc. ,343 United States v. Vertac Chemical Corp. ,344 and FMC 
Corp. v. United States Department of Commerce345 were decided 
correctly. In all three cases there were undoubtedly affirmative acts 
of control by the government; therefore, the first prong of the new 
test is satisfied. It is the second prong, operational control relating 
to waste disposal, that necessitates closer examination. 
In Iron Mountain, the court rightly declined to impose liability. 
The new test upholds this determination because, although the gov­
ernment took a high degree of control over the facility, it did not 
control waste disposal. Although. the government hired personnel 
fill. The town hired personnel, set wages, approved purchases of equipment (not re­
lated to waste disposal), and helped set policies regarding operating hours. The 
municipality, despite these elements of control, could not be held liable because it did 
not exercise any of its control in the area of waste disposal. Although it had personnel 
control, town officials did not make disposal decisions-the facility owner's managers 
did. Although the town exercised financial control, it did not control items and equip­
ment that affected waste disposal. Finally, even though it had some operational control 
(setting hours), it did not affect the manner of the facility's operation regarding waste 
disposal. 
341. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 72. 
342. See supra note 12 and accompanying text for a discussion of CERCLA's 
competing policy interests. 
343. 881 F. Supp. 1432 (E.D. Cal. 1995). See supra Part I.C.2.b for the facts of 
Iron Mountain. 
344. 46 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1995). See supra Part I.C.2.b for the facts of Vertae. 
345. 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994). See supra Part 1.C.2.b for the facts of FMC. 
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(and managed them to some degree), it was the civilian managers, 
not the government, that made disposal decisions.346 In addition, 
there is no indication that the government hired any personnel at 
the decision-making level. Also, despite the fact that the govern­
ment made certain improvements to the facility347 and determined 
what product it would make,348 none of these actions pertained di­
rectly to waste disposal. 
In Vertac, where the government exercised even less control 
than it did in Iron Mountain, the court similarly found the govern­
ment not liable.349 In Vertac, the government had control over cer­
tain health and safety related conditions at the plant,35o assisted the 
facility in obtaining raw materials,351 and influenced what product 
the facility produced.352 However, as in Iron Mountain, none of the 
control directly related to the disposal of waste. The Vertac court, 
in fact, emphasized that the facility's owner was solely responsible 
for waste disposal policy.353 
In FMC, the court correctly imposed liability on the govern­
ment. In that case, the government directly affected waste disposal 
by placing in the facility government-employed, management level 
personnel.354 Although there were many other indicia of govern­
ment control upon which the district court focused,355 none of them 
affected waste disposal. Thus, the one decisive factor in finding lia­
. bility is that which implicates the disposal of waste. 
On the other hand, under the new test, Washington v. United 
States356 was decided incorrectly. In Washington, like Iron Moun­
tain, the government placed on-site supervisors in the facility who 
"participated in managing and supervising the workers," and the 
346. See Iron Mountain, Inc., 881 F. Supp. at 1450. 
347. See id. at 1449. 
348. See id. at 1436. 
349. See Vertac Chern. Corp., 46 F.3d at 809. 
350. See id. at 806-07. 
351. See id. at 807. 
352. See id. at 806. 
353. See id. at 807. 
354. See FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 837 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (en banc). Note that this scenario is different from the one posed in the 
hypothetical in note 340. The hypothetical government-hired employee was an em­
ployee of the civilian owner (albeit chosen by the government) and was not a manage­
ment-level employee, whereas in FMC the management personnel were government 
employees. 
355. See id. at 844-45. 
356. 930 F. Supp. 474 (W.D. Wash. 1996). See supra Part I.C.2.b for the facts of 
Washington. 
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government provided financing and equipment for use at the facil­
ity.357 Also like Iron Mountain, this case contained numerous con­
trol factors that could lead one to conclude, mistakenly, that the 
government was an operator for CERCLA purposes.358 Still, the 
majority of the government's control factors had nothing to do with 
waste disposal and thus should not be used to determine operator 
liability. However, as noted earlier, the installation of government 
managers was sufficient for liability to attach in FMC.359 Through 
these managers, the government had at least some degree of con­
trol over the facility's waste disposal practices. Finally, the pres­
ence of full-time government managers, as in FMC, indicated a step 
above and beyond that which the government normally takes as a 
regulator. 
This new test may, on its face, appear to heavily favor govern­
mental bodies; however, one must keep in mind that CERCLA's 
purpose is to hold accountable those who were responsible for con­
tamination.360 Under this test, the government can only be held 
responsible if it actively participated in the actual disposal of 
waste-the very function CERCLA was intended to regulate. 
CONCLUSION 
The development of operator liability rules, particularly those 
pertaining to the government, has involved a long and arduous pro­
cess through the courts. In Best/oods, the Supreme Court provided 
a far simpler test that has already been applied in Brighton; how­
ever, the test has the potential of creating havoc in an area already 
plagued by uncertainty. The benefits of this new test could be im­
mensely augmented by synthesizing it with the traditional multi-fac­
tor tests used by courts since CERCLA's inception. The new three­
factor test advocated in this Note balances the competing policy in­
terests of CERCLA's broad remedial purpose and the danger of 
creating a disincentive to regulate. This test adds a degree of cer­
tainty previously unavailable in' government operator liability 
jurisprudence. 
Christopher J. Plaisted 
357, See id, at 483. 
358. See id, at 483-84. 
359. See supra notes 155-168 and accompanying text for the FMC court's defini­
tion of "operator." 
360. See supra note 2 for a discussion of CERCLA's broad remedial purpose. 
